


March 1951

50c

COMBAT FORCES

Infantry Journal • Field Artillery Journal



**DON'T JUMP
TO TANKS**

—
SAFE DRIVING

—
**RECIPE FOR
MOBILIZATION**

THE MAN IN THE FOXHOLE

A soldier tells civilians what it's like to be a fighting man

Lieutenant Robert T. Fallon

I WANT to tell you something about a war.

I want you to imagine for a moment that it is a very cold, wet, wintry evening at about 10 o'clock. You have been sitting very comfortably by your fireside reading the evening paper. It's been a pleasant day, dismal outside, but warm and restful by the fire. You decide to step out on the porch for a breath of air before turning in. I'm sure you've done it often. But on this particular evening, a strange sight greets you.

There's a great hole right in the middle of your front lawn, and the dirt has been thrown up all around it, outlined sharply against the white, even snow. Squatting in the hole is a hunched figure.

Let me tell you something about him.

He's been in this area now for about three weeks, living in a dozen holes just like this one on your front lawn. The most apparent thing about him is that he is cold, and that's because out on your lawn it's about 20 degrees colder than where you're standing. Every now and then he'll grab his shovel and dig a little deeper in the hole just to keep warm. That's the only way he has, because he'll be seen if he builds a fire, and he may bring mortar fire into your living room.

He's been cold for a long time—and wet. He can't feel his feet, and he's getting worried because he's afraid they might be frostbitten. It's going to be a long night, and it's going to get colder.

LIEUTENANT ROBERT T. FALLON, Infantry, was a member of the 17th Infantry, 7th Division, in Korea until he was wounded. He is a 1949 graduate of the Military Academy.

He's very dirty. The grease from a hundred C rations is frozen to his parka and gloves, coating the two weeks' beard which covers his face. Soot from the small fires he dares to make during the day is all over his pants and boots.

But he's dirty all the way through. He hasn't changed his underclothes in over a month and he doesn't intend to for some time to come. It's too cold to go down that far. You can smell him, and it's bad.

He's pretty hungry, too. They didn't get his rations up to him until after dark and he couldn't build a fire to thaw them out. He'll have to wait until morning. A cup of hot coffee would sure taste good. He looks old with that beard and sort of hunched over posture. But he's only about 19, though not like any 19-year-old you've ever seen.

YOU MAY wonder what he's thinking about as he sits there during those long solitary hours. Well, it's not much. Just how cold it is and again how nice that coffee would be. Maybe every now and then he thinks of home, but that's a long ways off and the cold, his feet and his hunger are much more immediate. You'd be surprised how those three things can fill your mind.

You notice that he's cut a hole through your hedge and his rifle is sitting on the pile of dirt pointing in readiness through the opening. That's another thing he's thinking: When are they coming again? He gets a little scared out there all alone. He'd like to go over and talk to his buddy in a similar hole about two houses up, but it's not a good idea to go crawling around at night.

He wishes they weren't so far apart but it seems they always have a big sector to cover with never enough men to cover it. It doesn't help being so far apart.

What would you like to do with this man? Ask him in to your fireside, get him a cup of coffee? Would you like to loan him your razor and let him take a hot shower? Give him a bed to sleep in instead of the dirt and cold of his foxhole? Sure you would! You wouldn't think twice about it. But I'm afraid you can't. There's someone on that hill over there who wants to get into your front door, and the man was told by his platoon leader that he's supposed to take care of your house and the one next door. So he can't come in and you find that you can't reach him. He's very far away.

But you come out in the morning and he's still there, huddled over his little fire, thawing out his hands and his rations, trying to get the feeling back into his feet. By this time the hole is pretty deep from all the digging and he's cut down a little more of your hedge. He's there again when you come home from work. While you are greeted by a comfortable fire in a living room, the soldier is getting ready for another cold night.

I HAVE told you about this soldier, and placed him on your front lawn, because I want you to realize that every desolate hill that soldier defends in that far-off land is in reality your front door. There are people who want to get in to do you harm, and it's his job to keep them away. He's going to do his job and he's not going to ask you to do it for him. If he has to sit on your front lawn in the cold, that's just the way things go. He's not going to begrudge you the comforts of your fireside or your dinner table, but he'll be mighty bitter if he finds out that you're not doing your part of the job.

What is "your job?" Well, it's not really important what I happen to think "your job" may be. But I think it is important that you find out soon what it is and start doing it, for whatever it is, it's a vital part of a country's struggle for existence. Perhaps it would be more clear to you what your job is if you returned home tonight to find that hunched, shivering figure sitting in a hole on your lawn.

TO THE EDITOR

State Guard Training

To the Editors:

Now that National Guard units are being mobilized there comes before us again the problem of organizing and training State Guard units to supplant them.

During the last war we trained several outfits that looked good on the drill floor. They were taught the manual of arms, close-order drill, first aid and riot control. Also a limited amount of battle training was absorbed. I doubt their effectiveness if we had been invaded.

This time let's train them to fight, not as regulars, but as guerrillas. Give them instruction on how to fight behind the enemy lines—cut communications, ambush convoys, blow up bridges. Teach them to raise particular hell behind the enemy lines if we are invaded.

Guerrilla warfare is a method of fighting, and a very effective one. It should be used in a combination of the methods and tactics of mechanized warfare and guerrilla warfare.

CHARLES W. STEVENS

Box 811
Red Lodge, Mont.

"The Question"

To the Editors:

As a new member, I received my first copy of your magazine the other day and enjoyed it very much. I was particularly struck with the article about "Stubb" and entitled "The Question."

I'd like to answer that question, by giving the full story of Stubb. (I don't really know Stubb; so in my own story he becomes not just a pen name but a complete fiction.)

First of all, Stubb, being fat and a little lazy, didn't care for physical education, so in the small Midwestern college he attended, he joined the ROTC. Stubb wasn't stupid; he was pretty conscientious, so in due course he graduated and received, in addition to his BA, an artillery commission. This, of course, didn't mean much to Stubb and if all had gone well, it wouldn't have meant much to anyone else. He would have just got a job somewhere and gone happily through life.

But we got into a war and Stubb discovered he was a patriot—he wanted to really get in and pitch. So he cashed in on his commission. But, things still kept going wrong. Stubb probably didn't act too much like an officer and certainly

didn't look like one. This made his CO very sad and as the Infantry, as always, was crying for officers, Stubb was quickly reclassified.

For a while, things went well and Stubb was happy—but only for a while. Soon Stubb became bored with training and he began to move about. (Not through his own efforts, mind you—if left to himself Stubb wouldn't move three feet.) If a request came down for officers to attend cooks' and bakers' school—Stubb's name headed the list. For motor maintenance school—again Stubb was first to go. Finally a request came down for fillers for a newly activated division. Stubb packed up and moved. This was a little more exciting so again for a while Stubb was active, but when a request for officers for shipment overseas came down, guess who was the first to go? Right! Stubb!

At long last, Stubb got a job for which he was really suited. He shone in all his glory. He really was a leader and a good one, too. As I said before, he was smart and conscientious. He was also amazingly resourceful. Within a few weeks, he was promoted to captain. The kid was terrific.

Why he ever stayed in the Army after the war was over I have no idea. Anyway, he stayed in and his troubles began anew. He soon fell back into his old ways and in the course of his wanderings ran into his old company commander, Major Gannett. This kindly old man took him aside and tried to make an officer of him. I have no doubt that in the many private talks, the Major pointed out to Stubb that training was dull and monotonous, but it was after all necessary (what a way to sell a product!). He probably also pointed out that as an officer he had to accept disagreeable duties as part of his lot and do them to the best of his ability. But, alas! Stubb soon resumed his travels.

Presumably, Stubb is now in Korea having himself a ball. If the war lasts long enough and Stubb's luck holds out he may easily wind up a colonel in a couple years. And then what the hell are you going to do with him?

It becomes increasingly obvious that the question is not "Does the Army need men like Stubb?" but "Does the Army deserve men like Stubb?" (As for that crack about "The supreme test of men is combat," that's just sheer nonsense.) The supreme test of an army may be war, but as the article so obviously demonstrated, the supreme test for Stubb was

peacetime. Combat was hardly even a short quiz.

Enough of Stubb's story. It's not a particularly happy one and it certainly poses a very real problem. But it also poses a very real solution. What the Army inadvertently did for Stubb during time of war could, and should, be done in a positive and intelligent way in time of peace.

It is time that the Army realized that an officer, regardless of rank, has definite limitations and cannot be expected to carry out duties for which he is unsuited just because he is an officer. If Major Gannett had spent half the time looking for a more suitable job for Stubb as he did trying to adapt Stubb to the job he had, I feel sure that the Major would have been doing not only Stubb but the Army a great service.

WESTON S. MCKANE

1189 Sumner Ave.,
Schenectady 8, N. Y.

• We enjoyed this readable comment, but we wonder if our new member and correspondent is fully aware of the extremely conscientious and continuing effort of career management and its Artillery, Infantry, Armor and other branches to solve just such problems as that of Stubb's. Also, it seems to us that a man so hot in combat should be able, better than many others, to see the relationship of training to combat and put it over realistically to the troops. In the post-war years he could hardly serve with troops anywhere and not be under the eye of a combat-experienced superior—if not his company commander, then his battalion or regimental commander. So he would have much encouragement in bringing realism into training. And what special kind of job should the Army dig up for Stubb? If he can't see the application of training to combat, where would he see it? In our opinion Stubb's trouble is psychological, and the Army's fault lies, not in failing to put him in some special job, but in failing to see clearly that he did have a not uncommon post-war psychological difficulty, and in not seeing to it that he received the advice and, if necessary, the treatment that would have helped him see where he was wrong.

Esperanto

To the Editors:

I'd like to comment on News of the Services, December, 1950, approximate center, page 32:

"The language barrier itself would be a vast obstacle to hurdle in mixing nationalities—one official suggesting humorously 'Possibly we can take time to teach Esperanto to all the soldiers.'"

As an American with nearly half a lifetime spent in foreign service of the US Government (now retired) I would call attention to the following facts, not

generally realized. Esperanto is today the standard world inter-language, so recognized and generally taught and used as such in progressive foreign countries.

Half a century hence, and maybe much less, the slogan, "Learn your own language, then Esperanto, and be understood anywhere," will probably be realized. Esperanto is less used in self-sufficient USA and Canada than in other parts of the world.

In all seriousness, personnel outside of the USA will find Esperanto easy to learn, and very profitable for them to know.

The writer is in no way interested in teaching it, or in corresponding on this matter, but refers any interested to American Headquarters, Esperanto, 114 West 16th Street, New York City.

VAN ALLEN LYMAN

Box 124,
Gamboa, C. Z.

• Esperanto and other inter-languages have won adherents in most countries. So have those who favor a simplified form of English in view of the rapid spread of English during the last few centuries. In Russia, interest in such movements is in great disfavor.

Tactics in Korea

To the Editors:

I've been a reader of the *Infantry Journal* several years and wish your new or-

ganization much success. This morning the radio brings news of further unexpected setbacks in Korea. I am a civilian without any military experience except three visits as a civilian to the former annual trek to Camp Perry. As a civilian I am deeply dissatisfied with the news from Korea and also dissatisfied with the way that news has been presented.

Though it is a minor expedition, as to both tactics and strategy, I measure the worth of such campaigns by their successes. I have tried to figure out what really happened north of the 38th parallel, and I believe the American people would feel better and be better off if they knew what actually did happen, because the Communist leaders certainly know. In many ways, also, there has been too much publicity on what should have been withheld for security reasons.

From my vantage point as a Caspar Milquetoast civilian, I believe any officer or official, who panics in an emergency, should at once become a private or a civilian.

In Korea, apparently the UN forces are using the Air Force for most of the raiding, scouting, etc. Each time our forces go on the defensive the indications are that the ground forces become one hundred per cent on that defensive. Most news stories give the impression that our forces dig in and then wait. Many times contact is lost with the enemy until the enemy chooses to attack. If that has been actually the situation, it certainly puzzles me. The UN forces should be as much as possible on the offensive. That means there should be constant raiding forces outside the defense line working the enemy over, raiding, skirmishing, constantly doing damage and keeping contact with the enemy. The UN forces should regroup all forces to put more effective into combat—with a minimum of noncombatant elements. We need to defend only what we can defend on a semioffensive basis. The matter of raiding outside the defense line would require special activities and precautions as in guerrilla warfare. Raiding by the air force would need to fit in properly with the ground raids.

Your publication is to be congratulated on the several recent articles regarding the use of our manpower in the military.

It is a relief to my feelings to state some of the things I think to a source I confidently believe is better informed than I am and better qualified to pass judgment upon the recent military events.

HARRY H. HOBBS

Yankton, S. D.

• Whatever the mistakes have been in Korea, we agree with Mr. Hobbs that the news has often not been clearly reported. The needs of security have been of utmost importance. But also, the papers of the country have not ap-

peared in general to understand that wars are seldom composed of successive victories and little else. Only recently have they begun to show some clear understanding of defensive tactics and strategy, and stopped implying utter defeat whenever our troops pull back.

Army Propaganda

To the Editors:

Recent statements by public figures with their heads in the sand have created the danger that the Army will be de-emphasized and that disaster will result.

I believe that a great propaganda campaign is necessary to sell the public and the Congress on the need for a large army, and I believe that an organization such as yours, the Association of the United States Army, being unofficial, is the agency to spark such a campaign.

First of all, Clausewitz should be popularized. Articles based on his ideas should appear in all types of magazines and newspapers and aimed at all types of readers. This campaign should make use of the latest techniques in mass education, of which the military are the acknowledged masters in this country. Perhaps use could be made of a cartoon like Disney's version of *Victory Through Air Power*. Then, once the truths set forth by Clausewitz have been implanted in the public mind, the follow-up should show how these principles call for a large army, and how history shows that there should be a large American army.

An appeal should be made not only to the intelligence of the public, but also (especially) to its emotions. Thus the current Hollywood fad for making Army pictures should be encouraged and assisted. Such pictures can be very effective because many people accept them as historical fact. ("There was nothing in *Guadalcanal Diary* about the Army.") Articles should be circulated through the mass circulation press dealing with historic units and how the old traditions are being maintained today, and so on.

The Army itself can do quite a bit in this direction. The history and traditions of old Regular Army, National Guard, and AUS outfits should be emphasized within the service, and communicated to the public by the use of special uniforms

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and insignia. Films should be made for the orientation of new recruits dealing with unit histories and the workings of all types of modern military units. These should then be released, a few at a time, to civilian exhibitors in order that the public may see what their boys are learning and doing in the army.

It might be said that such a program would be un-American because it is wrong for the military to try to influence the public; but we have only to look at the National Guard Association, the Navy League, and others, to realize that this would merely be following in good old American tradition. To paraphrase Gilbert and Sullivan, "Everybody else does, why can't we?"

And now some suggestion dealing with your capacity as editor.

I would like very much to see a revival of *Battle Facts For Your Outfit* in the Journal.

STEPHEN T. MEADOW

63 Clark Street
Paterson 1, N. J.

• We agree that continuous efforts should be made to show the dangers of an unbalanced defense force, with the Army kept too small. And we agree that it is a main job of our Association to help state the facts, and that the Army and the Defense Department could do still more to show the indispensability of an adequate Army. But you can't force propaganda into newspapers, radio, television and schools. Entirely aside from the dangers to freedom (and unconstitutionality) of such an effort, and the resistance of the press, etc., to outright propaganda, such an effort would, we think, be self-defeating. It would sound like propaganda, and be discounted accordingly. The public understanding is not as poor as it is sometimes believed to be. Polls have shown plainly that the people believe we should have a good, strong army. They have gathered that much from Korea. The people also see, and much more clearly than ever in the past, the military threat of Communism, although this can be made still more plain. On the other hand, the old hope that machines and bombs might still do most of the winning is hard to set aside. And for a great many American parents, as well as their sons, the Air Force and the Navy have the appeal of supposedly being more technical and "more modern," as well as safer. (The thought of "safer" service very often lies unspoken or hardly realized at all behind the other arguments.) Thus in making its

appeal to the public the Army, and the Department of Defense for the Army, have to take all these facts and others into consideration. The question has to be continually asked: "What can we say that will help the people see even better how vital a sizable Army is to them, and how they themselves will provide that Army?" And while doing this, the great modern variety in Army service and equipment should be emphasized along with the rest. And above all, it seems to us, there should be special appeal to those who may serve in the Combat Forces—that it needs real men. We must constantly be on guard against the tendency to discount the Army. But so far as we can see, this is not being neglected at the present. When public figures make unrealistic statements about the supposed sufficiency of an air-sea defense, the public just doesn't swallow it these days. And the defense authorities respond at once with restatement of the facts, as do the headlines. "Battle Facts for Your Outfit" was opened up again in our January issue.

Promotion

To the Editors:

The current Army officer temporary promotion system violates all that the Army has taught me during the last eleven years about fairness and avoidance of discrimination. It is based in part, it has been announced, on bringing into closer alignment permanent and temporary dates of rank. Consequently, age is often rewarded at the expense of ability and experience. For the sake of this discussion only, I will not quibble over this aspect but will merely assume that it is desirable and just.

My chief objection stems from the fact that Reserve officers are being promoted on the basis of their temporary rank while Regulars are considered only according to their permanent dates of rank. Many Regular officers are finding that officers who are their juniors in temporary dates of rank are being promoted, while those who were considered able enough to hold Regular commissions are not even being considered because of their low permanent date of rank. In the last round of promotions to lieutenant colonel all Reserve officers who held temporary majorities since prior to 30 June 1945 were considered. But there are hundreds of Regular officers who have been majors since long before that date, who were not considered because of low permanent dates of rank. Sometimes officers of approximately the same age, temporary grade, and date of rank applied for integration into the Regular Army, and later those not integrated were not even considered because of low permanent date of rank.

To bring order out of this chaotic and unjust situation I strongly recommend

that all Regular officers, regardless of permanent date of rank, who meet the cut-off date of rank criteria for Reserve officers also be promoted.

MAJOR DISILLUSIONMENT

Expert Badge Program

To the Editors:

The Military Establishment of the United States is preparing to train several thousands of American men for national defense. Many of these men will be trained for combat duty with the Army Field Forces. These men will be expected to attain a high degree of excellence as soldiers and this achievement should be recognized by the Army.

At one time the soldier who passed a series of difficult infantry tests was classified as an Expert Infantryman with an appropriate badge and a monthly pay increase of five dollars. This should be reinstituted in all the arms of the Field Forces: Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Combat Engineers, and Medical Corps men assigned to combat units.

Each soldier who reaches the desired level of attainment in his particular arm should be authorized a five dollar pay increase and the right to wear the Expert Badge of his arm. Each arm could use its distinctive colors and insignia in the design of a badge modeled on the Expert Infantryman Badge.

The expert soldier should be required to pass another standardized test at the end of twelve months or lose his extra pay and the right to wear the expert badge.

Such a program should serve to increase the esprit de corps of the Combat Forces. Pride of country, arm, unit, and self are contributory factors to high morale.

M/Sgt. MATTHEW C. RYAN, JR.
Inf. USAR

Box 102
Danville, Va.

417th at Echternach

To the Editors:

In reading your December 1949 issue, I came across an article that really made me feel bad, "Bulgeland Revisited" by Captain Robert E. Merriam.

On page 15 in the upper right hand corner the article states: "Or Echternach where the 4th Infantry Division was punished but not pushed!" I don't like to take credit away from any unit at all but please give credit to the right unit.

On February 7, 1945, the 1st Battalion, 417th Infantry, was engaged in a battle taking the city of Echternach. This statement can be backed up by the commanding officers whose address is Col. Clarence A. Mette, Jr., 1501 W. 87th Street, Los Angeles 44, Calif.

I was a member of the regiment.

WILBUR G. MARTIN

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Vol. 1, No. 8

March 1951

COVER: Neither snow, nor rain . . . can stop the Redlegs from firing their appointed rounds! A 153mm. in Korea. (Department of Defense photo)

THE MAN IN THE FOXHOLE.

Lieutenant Robert T. Fallon

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YOU AND YOUR ARMY

The Men Who Win

THE Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy and Air Force of the United States when he presented Medals of Honor to relatives of five soldiers:

"At this point I want to pay tribute to the ground soldiers, the men who hold the ground and who fight from the trenches and from machine gun nests, and who receive the fire and the treatment which you have heard outlined in these citations. They are not the glamor boys of the services, but they are the men who win the wars and who make it possible for us to have freedom in this great Nation of ours."

Responsible Journalism

WAR reporting from Korea has improved so greatly from what it was last summer and early fall that we are going to offer three cheers and a tiger here to the Korean correspondents and their editors. The big improvement came when the newspapermen discovered that you can't mix Ernie Pyle and straight reporting. There was a time in Korea when the comments of a corporal on the logistical capabilities of the North Koreans rated a two-column head on the front page and any plc-rifleman who had an opinion about General Walker's tactical dispositions got a better press than the General himself. The whole thing was so absurd that it collapsed of its own inanity and the reporters began to differentiate between news and features. And the public, which for a time couldn't possibly understand what was going on in Korea, is now being informed.

We had been aware of this improvement for some time, but we were forcibly impressed by our evening paper of 22 January. It is an Associated Press newspaper and every Korean

story in it was attributed to the AP. But the other wire services and the "specials" have improved, too, and so this is not to be taken as a tribute directed solely at the Associated Press.

The lead story that night reported that motorized and armored patrols—"beefed-up" was the word used in the headline—had thrust deep into Communist territory and had returned without difficulty. It went on to quote General Ridgway as saying that we are "getting better all the time," briefly described the experiences of each of the patrols and rounded off the story with a report on the activities of the air forces during the period. The reader of this round-up of what had been going on in Korea since the Sunday morning paper had come out could feel informed. But that was just the beginning. Inside the paper were stories that helped fill out the outline. In one, William C. Barnard described the landing of General Ridgway at Wonju airstrip "several hours after it was retaken" and told of General Ridgway's enthusiasm and spirit as he talked with commanders on the spot, and how he visited a regimental command post of the 2d Division.

Jim Becker, another AP man, was with the 3d Division that day. He obtained some quotable comments from Major General Robert H. Soule, the division commander. "We can stop the Chinese on this line or any other line they tell us to hold," the General is quoted as saying. "All they have is hordes, and how many hordes are there in a battalion? We need to get over this awe of numbers and get used to the idea that we can whip them because we can." That sounded very optimistic at the time but events in the following two weeks seemed to uphold General Soule.

In still another dispatch, AP man Stan Swinton, writing from Tokyo, reported that "captured Chinese Red combat information bulletins" paint

a rather unflattering picture of the American soldier's fighting ability. But instead of swallowing this without a question as most surely would have been done a few months earlier, Swinton injected a note of caution: "The reports probably minimize American fighting effectiveness in an effort to spur Red soldiers into greater efforts." That note of warning, we think, is responsible journalism, especially when it closed with this paragraph of pertinency:

"American officers are impressed by the thorough study the Chinese Communists have made of American tactics. With cool calculation the Reds have tried to chart a fighting course in which sheer manpower, cleverly directed, can overcome the twin American advantages of mobility and massed fire power."

Yes, an American reading his newspaper on the evening of 22 January 1951 could feel that he was well informed about the progress of the war, the current opinions of the commanders, the difficulties that confront our forces, and the Communists' own opinion of us.

That kind of journalism is a vital service to the American people. Only one thing is missing, and that is a man capable of stepping into Ernie Pyle's shoes to report (separately) the soldier's war. But, like lightning, genius doesn't strike twice . . . very often.

General Ike

GREATER honors and graver responsibilities have come to few men than General Eisenhower. His frank and friendly manner, breadth of character and intelligence, and great selflessness are the qualities that have so caught the heart and mind of Western civilization that it has placed upon him the most sensitive and difficult duties. For more than thirty years he was one of us, knew and wanted no

other life than Army life. But now that we must share him with the world he must know that the United States Army is pulling for him, helping him where and when it can. We cannot but believe that General Ike is strengthened by that knowledge. And we of the Army are strengthened by having had him and by now sharing him with the world.

Syllogism

WE suggest you try this syllogism on your company (battery) logician:

In an army, the smaller the services of supply are in proportion to its total strength, the more efficient that army is;

The Soviet Army has a smaller services of supply in proportion to its total strength than the US Army;

Therefore, the Soviet Army is more efficient than the US Army.

Say it fast and even your logician may blink. But then, if he's the logician we think he is, he'll take hold of that major premise and shake out its fallacies like a terrier with a rat.

But it is some such syllogism as this that is at stake when you read of comparisons between our own so-called

division slice and the Soviet division slice. The Soviet Army slice is doubtlessly actually, proportionately, potentially and indubitably smaller than our slice. It may be true that by our own standards the Russian armies simply cannot long exist with such a small supporting slice. But they lasted through four years of war and were stronger at the end than at the beginning; so saying that gives us the makings of another premise that won't stand up. Instead of assertions it would seem the better part of wisdom to try to understand the differences in the two armies. This we are able to do, thanks to an unofficial, unclassified, uninhibited staff paper that was given to us for just this purpose.

No one has to be told that the Soviets have little use for the recreational and information activities that we consider essential and which materially increase our slice of supporting troops.

A Russian recruit gets very little, if any, training before joining a combat unit, and he then serves a longer period than our soldiers, who currently are getting fourteen weeks of basic training and will probably serve from twenty-one to twenty-seven months. This means the Russians get more

service out of each man per day trained. Your company computer can tell you that that is no small figure when you multiply it by the number of men we are going to train in the next few years.

The Soviet lines of communications are far shorter than our own. Unless you have looked into it you'd be amazed at the way our overseas pipelines swallow up manpower; especially manpower with a twenty-one (or twenty-seven-) month tag on it.

The goings and comings are terrific—have to be.

The Russians make extensive use of forced civilian labor in rear-area installations. At the time this was written it seemed problematical whether the United States government could even persuade free, well paid railroad men that they weren't too sick to work.

The Soviet anti-aircraft artillery is partly manned by civilians. We aren't even at the point of using Wacs in the AAA, as the British did in World War II.

The amateur and pseudo-logisticians who have the Soviet Army slice figured out to the nearest decimal may not know that the Soviet high command has the funny habit of calling combat support and line of communications units "combat divisions." Unless you know just how many of these kinds of units are included in the 175 divisions that the Russians are usually estimated to have, you can't figure their slice at all accurately.

Finally, the Soviet combat division probably averages some 8,000 officers and men instead of the 10,000 figure usually ascribed.

All of this adds up to another syllogism that we commend to your logician:

People who compare unlike things get silly conclusions;
The Soviet and US services of supply are unlike things;
Therefore, any one who compares them is going to get a silly conclusion.

Valuable Survey

WE wonder how he ever found the time to do it but a company commander in Korea has sent us a survey he made of the reactions of his company to combat. The survey was made during four months in Korea and can therefore be presumed to reflect the opinions of men who have had combat experience typical to the Korean war. Several of the answers to questions provide an illuminating guide to the problems of training the army we are now mobilizing.

To start things off with a bang, consider this. Not one of the 153 men in the company thought that pre-Korean discipline "was most valuable in preparing them for combat" but eleven of them thought that discipline should be stressed more in training. As we understand this it means that the dis-



Bill Mauldin for the Armed Forces Press Service
"Man, I feel plumb obsolete"

cipline of our pre-Korean army was not the kind of discipline that is needed when the guns begin to shoot. This is not news, of course, but it is news, we think, when soldiers acknowledge the importance of discipline in this way.

Tables and figures are usually pretty deadening but the two that follow ought to excite hard thought.

To the question "What phase of Army training was most valuable in preparing you for the Korean war?" these soldiers answered as follows:

Combat tactics	47
Physical training	40
Individual training	15
Weapons training	5
Communication	2
Mountain training	1
All training	4
All field training	14
Discipline	0
Leadership	1
First aid	1
How to live off the land	1
Field sanitation	2
Infantry training	10
None	11

And to the question "What phase of Army training should be stressed more to prepare you for combat?" they answered:

Combat tactics	55
Physical training	47
Individual training	9
Weapons training	10
Communication	0
Mountain training	5
All training	3
All field training	1
Discipline	11
Leadership	3
First aid	1
Field sanitation	1
None	2

Those two tables are actually the meat, potatoes and gravy of the whole survey. But there are other relevant facts.

Eighty of the men thought that the training they had before the war had prepared them for it and seventy-two of them thought it had not.

Twenty-five of them had been in combat previously and 128 had not. Sixty-seven of them said they were Regulars, expecting to make the Army their career. Eighty-five of them said they did not expect to stay in the Army. One said he was undecided. (This adds up to 111 men, which may be explained by the fact that the questions were asked over a period of sev-

eral months as the strength of the company rose and fell.)

To the question "Do you feel that you have a position on the rifle company team?" 149 said yes and three said no. On the related question, "Do you feel that you know your job at this period of combat?" 148 said yes and four said no.

Most of the men were between eighteen and twenty-two years of age. Three of them were seventeen. Fifteen of them were thirty or more with three thirty-six-year-olds being the oldest.

Soldier's Message

IF you are a hard-bitten Regular with three or more wars under your belt or if you are a downy-faced recruit we hope you read Lieutenant Robert T. Fallon's fine and imaginative description of combat in Korea which appears on the inside front cover of this issue. Lieutenant Fallon wrote the piece for *The Richmond News-Leader* and it was later reprinted in *The Washington Star*. We understand it may get even wider publication in a national magazine. We hope so for it brings combat home to the civilian better than anything we have read in years. We reprint it because we think you'll like the implied tribute to the combat soldier and because it tells the soldier now in training here something of the job that faces him.

National Guard Manpower

ONE of the missions of the National Guard—perhaps its chief one—is to furnish trained and equipped units fit for service anywhere anytime. This is no small job, as you'll agree, but few of us know that in times of partial mobilization, such as the present, that job is many times more difficult, because the Guard has to scurry about and compete for manpower in the same market as the Regular Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. In peaceful times the Guard does a pretty good job of getting men—never as many as it can use, though—but when war comes the American male seems to want all or nothing and goes into active service, which makes the Guard's ranks almost impossible to fill. One proposal aimed at helping it right now is that it be permitted to enlist 18-year-olds not called for active service. When General Eisenhower

was asked by a Senator what he thought of that he put his finger squarely on another of the Guard's difficulties. "The National Guard," the General said, "is for trained men—not for training." It is obvious that if the Guard is to be ready for anything anytime it can't rely entirely on untrained 18-year-olds.


Since the end of World War II the Guard has done an extremely able job of organizing and equipping all of its units. However, it has never—and largely through no fault of its own—been able to maintain all of its units at maximum efficiency. Unit commanders at all levels have been forced to devote so much time to the recruiting of men and basic training that unit training has suffered. Any experienced soldier knows how difficult it is to keep an outfit on its toes when it has groups of men in different stages of training. A large influx of 18-year-olds at this time would disrupt the progress of many units.

As a longtime measure 18-year-olds would be great. So would the Universal Military Service and Training bill now being considered by Congress. However, we mustn't lose sight of the fact that even if UMST legislation becomes law, the National Guard will still be faced with a long period of drought before trained personnel will flow from training into Guard units. Meanwhile, the competition for personnel continues apace with the Guard units losing ground rapidly. Without mobilization of all the Guard units, there seems to be no other way in which they will be able to maintain their strengths unless they are provided with additional men right now.

Report on the Pentagon

ONE of our staff members has just reported back after fifteen days of duty with the Army General Staff. It was his first study in that rarified atmosphere—and he was impressed. Without stopping to think of the implied rebuke to his editorial colleagues, he reported: "There are a lot of sharp customers around the Pentagon; people who work hard and think fast. They look at things from a lot of angles, and there's more to the job than moving papers from the 'In' basket to the 'Out' basket."

We have known that partly from Colonel Purcell's "The Rat Race" in last month's issue and partly from our own observations.




Use Your Weapons

Colonel George E. Lynch

*You can drive your assault home if you know how
to use your own crew-served infantry weapons*

COLONEL GEORGE E. LYNCH, Infantry, is on duty in Washington. During World War II he commanded the 142d Infantry, 36th Infantry Division. He is a 1929 graduate of the Military Academy.

INFANTRY officers are inclined to neglect their own crew-served weapons. This neglect, unlike that of the rifleman who does not fire his weapon in combat, is not attributable to psy-



chological reasons; the reasons are more definable, easier to identify.

The main reason for non-firing of crew-served infantry weapons is insufficient training of officers who direct or control them. The coordination of men, movement and weapons during a fight is difficult. Pressure of time, enemy action, and the many unknowns which influence battle magnify the difficulty.

A rifle company moves out in attack, carrying its crew-served weapons. It relies on overcoming close opposition by its own rifle-platoon weapons, and more distant opposition by calling for battalion mortar fire or supporting artillery fire, and if lucky, close-support aviation. The captain is reluctant to emplace his

own mortars, for there's a good chance the opposition may be overcome before his mortars can become effective. Also, he often becomes embroiled in the fire fight, forgets his mortars, and uses only men and rifles (and possibly light machine guns fired from the arms). Ammunition resupply always being a problem, particularly in hill or mountain fighting where each round must be carried on a man's back, the cool commander will rightly call for supporting fires wherever possible so as to save his precious ammunition for some later crucial time. Too, there is frequently the feeling that "if the 60mm mortar is good for this target, the 81mm or 4.2-inch would be that much better."

The battalion problem is much the

same as that in the rifle company, except that sizes and numbers of available weapons are greater.

Our supporting weapons have become so numerous, powerful and mobile, that the battalion or company commander, in the comfortable habit of knowing he can rely on their power, loses his appreciation of the effectiveness of his own crew-served weapons. When confronted with a situation in which the only available weapons are his own, the lack of other supporting fires may cause him to feel his task cannot be accomplished. This situation is very unlikely in gentle country abounding in roadnets, but it is not uncommon in hill country. In passing, Clausewitz advises that decisive action cannot be attained in mountains. However, mountains are where you find them, a defensive enemy will use them, so there must be some fighting in the mountains.

THE capabilities of battalion weapons were most graphically impressed on me in the fighting between Anzio and Rome on an occasion early in June 1944. Somewhere in the Alban Hills, which had practically no roadnet, overlooking the Pope's summer residence at Castel Gandolfo, our 142d Infantry Regimental Combat Team came up against a strongpoint situated on top of a 3,000-foot conical hill. On the peak was a tourist hotel, inclosed by a solid masonry wall four to six feet high, and surmounted with barbed wire on the south wall. The hotel offered a view for miles in all directions, particularly over the Germans' escape road leading to Rome.

We had been in the hills for four days, relying on manpack for our supplies, including water. The battalions were stripped down to essentials. Men carried much in excess of normal ammunition loads. Of the six 81mm mortars in each battalion, four had been left at our roadhead to allow their crews to carry ammunition for the remaining two mortars. The proportion of heavy to light rounds of ammunition was reduced.

Two rifle battalions were in column to take advantage of the only trail we could find paralleling the ridge line—elsewhere all was dense underbrush and forest, except in the flats below where the 1st Battalion was securing the downhill flank,



It's fire power that wins. And the rocket launcher is a weapon that can participate in an infantry attack. Here a bazooka team fires into a house that has been turned into a strong-point by Germans in Italy.

against good opposition. Arriving at the mountain, topped by the walled hotel and manned by a German delaying force, we came under fire of small arms, mortars and artillery. Now it happened that another mountain road led to the hotel over which our tanks, some distance in rear, might be able to join us. The battalion commander in the lead proposed that the tanks be brought up this road to blast an entrance into the wall to be followed by his infantry assault. I approved his plan. Meanwhile, his three rifle companies deployed around the upper reaches of the hill on three sides, occupying the Germans with desultory fire. It became apparent that the tanks would be unable to negotiate the trail and darkness would find us short of our objective.

Going forward to the battalion CP to see what could be done, I found the situation as shown on the sketch.

It was apparent that the slope of the hill was so steep and our own companies so close to its top that use of supporting artillery would be impossible without a withdrawal. And, of course, if the companies withdrew downhill to a distance reasonably safe from short artillery rounds, the return to attack positions would allow the Germans plenty of time to recover from our artillery preparation. Artillery was out! Tanks were out! Battalion weapons, and these reduced in number, were all we could use. It looked tough, but we had either to go forward or backward, for thirty men of Company F had already been killed or wounded by

fire directed by observers in the hotel.

ALTHOUGH the battalion commander was doubtful of the mission, a short conference with the company commanders, each of whom had excellent information of the area to his front, produced what seemed to be a workable plan of attack without any outside support. On a time schedule in conjunction with radio orders and visual signals, the two 81mm mortars poured a hundred and fifty rounds into the wall inclosure, none escaping the wall which protected our riflemen from fragments. Some of this ammunition, incidentally, had to come

from the 3d Battalion, trailing in reserve. At the end of a five-minute mortar preparation which included 60mm as well as the 81mm mortars, all three rifle companies took up heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. Although Companies E and G were firing toward each other, the slope of the hill protected them.

Company G was to make the assault. One platoon of the company worked its way to a position about thirty yards from the wall while the other two platoons fixed the Germans behind the wall (that is, provided these Germans had not taken shelter in the hotel during the mortar preparation and the small-arms fire that followed). Company bazookas mingled with the rifle and machine-gun fire. On signal of the company commander, company fires ceased, the assault platoon rushed the wall, flinging fragmentation grenades over the wall before climbing it, and quickly rounded up the garrison, of whom about thirty were killed or wounded, fifty were whole, and an unknown number had departed. The whole German force had been probably not much more than a hundred, but with a strong position, fine observation and supporting fires, it made a respectable obstacle.


The assault company, really a platoon, with the remainder of the company supporting, received not one casualty in this attack, the objective was gained quickly, and a lesson in appreciation of and coordination of the rifle battalion's organic weapons was deeply impressed on us all.

Know and use your weapons.

Weapons Mean Fire Power

Unless we in America utilize to the utmost the great advantage that our superior scientific and industrial genius can provide, we will assuredly place our soldiers at a disadvantage upon the fields of battle if this present war should expand, or if war should come elsewhere in the world. We should not try to match potential enemies man-for-man: because an attempt to do so would place such great demands upon our manpower resources that we would undoubtedly court destruction of the very way of life that we are trying to preserve. We clearly demonstrated in World War II that our tremendous productive capacity for modern weapons, coupled with numbers of men far less than those of our enemies, could provide a winning combination.—GENERAL


J. LAWTON COLLINS.



It's flying artillery so it ought to be in the Army

DIRECT SUPPORT AVIATION

COLONEL W. W. FORD



MOST of us in the Army are convinced that our tactical aviation has not been as effective as it should be. There is no unanimous agreement on a remedy but the most prevalent one is to place tactical aviation under operational control of the Army.

But this is only a half measure! Placing tactical air under operational control of the Army commander might relieve certain tensions, irritations and delays at command level, but it would not go to the root of the matter. The real difficulty lies much deeper, where it has been imbedded through the periods following two World Wars, and now through Korea. The difficulty has not been lessened by unification.

Briefly stated, the difficulty is that teamwork is not to be had merely by an all-out effort of assorted players, no matter how individually skillful. Whether the uniforms match does not matter, but daily practice, undivided attention and good coaching, not only during the game but throughout the season, are essential. No one has suggested that it might be adequate for a football coach to have "operational control" of his backfield on Saturday afternoons.

"Tactical aviation" is a broad term. Practically all offensive air missions have tactical implications, and even those missions properly called tactical may vary widely in the directness of their effect upon the ground combat forces. Tactical aviation isolating the battlefield affects the ground soldier

COLONEL W. W. FORD, Artillery, was an enlisted man in World War I and a Brigadier General in World War II. He is the Army's senior light plane pilot and has been a field artilleryman since he graduated from West Point in 1920. He is now on duty at Fort Bragg, N. C.

enormously, but indirectly. Tactical aviation striking enemy elements with which the ground soldier is in contact affects him enormously, and at once. Close-in air support poses problems of training, liaison, coordination and understanding which exist in no other type of offensive air operations. It is aviation for this close-in support (let's call it direct-support aviation) which I want to examine in this article.

Direct-support aviation is that phase of air support which undertakes the job of beating down the opposition immediately confronting the ground forces in combat. It is artillery on wings instead of wheels. The command most capable of controlling it adequately and effectively, and of helping it in finding its targets, is the artillery. It is tailor-made for the corps artillery commander, who already has the forward control parties and communications network to do the job. But this won't get the job done if the corps artillery commander on the eve of battle is handed "operational control" of air units which, however polished they may be in other jobs, are ill-equipped for direct-support work.

DIRECT-SUPPORT aviation can not be a part-time job, to be performed when the need for other air missions has subsided. On the contrary, it is a full-time job. Its need is greatest *before* the battlefield has been isolated, when our ground combat forces are at grips with the un-reduced strength of enemy weapons and personnel. I am quite aware of the contention that direct-support aviation cannot survive until local air superiority has been gained. But the answer to that is easy. Unless the need is urgent, direct-support aviation should not be sacrificed where the enemy is locally dominant. If the need is urgent, heavy losses can be taken, just as they are taken by armored and infantry units. In the more favorable and, we hope, more normal situation where our own air force is winning control of the air, a direct support aviation (Army) could go to work long before the tactical air force completed its job of "isolating the battlefield," a condition which is never fully attained. *These are two separate tactical air jobs!*

The argument that admits the need for close-support aviation but holds that our economy cannot afford a

weapon created solely for this purpose is preposterous. We deny ourselves no other essential weapon on such a basis.

It is false to say that the type of fighter needed by the tactical and strategic air forces can do the close-support job effectively. These jets are too fast, they require too much fuel, and they must as a rule be based too far from the troops they support. Here, again, I am aware of a contrary view, and of the opinions rendered by highly placed persons that the jets have done a good direct-support job in Korea. But we must allow for bias, as well as for a sympathetic attitude toward a teammate who has done his best. Why were F-51s rushed to Korea? While admitting that jets are less vulnerable to both ground fire and hostile fighters, let's not forget that they are *less effective* in the close-support role. Jet fighters may afford a somewhat more stable gun platform but the gun (or bomb or rocket) has to be aimed at something. Targets in the front-line areas are dispersed and concealed. I have seen newspaper reports which quoted fighter pilots as saying they could never have located the target but for the help of a little slow-flying artillery observation plane which put them on it. Speed works both ways.

AIR UNITS trained primarily for another job cannot possibly function as effectively in the close-support role as air units whose whole existence is geared to the support of ground combat arms. The Marine air arm has taught us a lesson here. Our own infantry and artillery long ago gave up the idea of fighting separate battles. The teamwork that gives them their great battle power was attained only by living together, training together, going to school together, and devoting their entire service lives to a common end. It isn't perfect. But think how much less perfect it would be if the direct-support artillery joined its infantry as the battle commenced, having been trained elsewhere in "similar methods." It is no accusation against the faith and devotion of our present tactical aviation, when available and when so employed, nor against its skill in what it considers its primary role, to say that it falls far short of close-support requirements. It is simply trying to do things the hard way. We have already had a lesson of this sort in the case of air observa-

tion for artillery. For more than twenty years we tried to provide air observation by non-organic units. It never worked. In 1942 air observation was made organic to the artillery and there has been no further trouble.

WE NEED close-support aviation organic to the Army: trained and controlled by the Army. Beyond that, tactical aviation of greater speed and range, seeking targets beyond the immediate concern of ground forces in combat, should continue to be provided by the Air Force. Army intelligence is best equipped to obtain targets for close-support aviation; Air Force intelligence can more effectively discover the targets farther out.

We need to develop a plane better adapted to the close-support role. Piston-engined fighters are indicated at present; the Marines' Corsair has been brilliant in this role. It is inconceivable that a satisfactory combination of interceptor-fighter and close-support aircraft can not be found.

We can create effective close-support aviation in the Army without cutting down the size of the Tactical Air Force. It should have plenty of fighters to insure a fair life-expectancy for our close-support (Army) aviation. The creation of close-support aviation in the Army will not warrant the reduction of the United States Air Force by a single squadron.

CLOSE-SUPPORT aviation, organic to the Army, was considered vitally necessary by many Army officers before Korea. Their views were then theoretical. We have now had practical demonstration. There is little doubt that the Marines had an effective close-support aviation while the Army did not.

A major obstacle to its attainment is the realization that the cost could not come within the Army's "cut" of the existing National Defense budget. So what? We will not get effective close-support aviation for nothing, wherever we seek to install it. If we must spend hundreds of millions of dollars for this essential weapon, we had better spend them where they will do the most good. The American public, whose sons in the ground combat forces absorb nine-tenths of all battle casualties, will not be niggardly in providing what it takes to do the job.



Tanks massed in the open are the natural prey of artillery and tactical air power.



Tanks operating in rough or wooded country can be destroyed by antitank weapons.



Mines—by the hundreds and thousands—can stop tanks when used resourcefully.

Don't Jump to Tanks

Our great need is for a relatively inexpensive but plentiful weapons system that will give us and our allies the power to defeat the enemy's armor while leaving us free to develop offensive weapons of greater mobility and shocking power.

Lieutenant Colonel William R. Kintner

DURING the first critical summer days of the Korean war, marked by the long retreat back to the Pusan bridgehead, the Soviet-made T34 tanks used by the North Koreans were a formidable menace. The impressive gains made by the North Korean tanks inspired considerable criticism of our Army's armor. Now that this particular "tank crisis" has passed we are in danger of not weighing these enemy successes with balanced judgment and concluding that this coun-

try's security requires tanks—tanks out of all proportion to their value to us. We like a simple answer to our military problems, and we know that American industry can turn out a lot of tanks. But let's not jump to simple conclusions or too many tanks. The first waves of Red tanks which rumbled across the 38th parallel had a heyday. None of armor's arch enemies was available to the defense at the time these Red tanks chalked up their big gains. But once these enemies made their appearance, the invading tanks lost their effectiveness on the battlefield and their space in American headlines. The natural enemies of the tank form an air-ground weapons system comprising the land mine, the bazooka (with the shaped-charge warhead), artillery, the rocket-firing aircraft, and engineer units equipped to neutralize or destroy paths suitable for tank travel. This system developed with surprising speed in Korea and once it became effective, the T34 lost most of its potency.

Exploiting surprise, the North Ko-

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM R. KINTNER, Infantry, is a regular-contributor to this magazine. A former Coast Artilleryman who transferred to the Infantry after the war, he commanded an automatic weapons battalion in Europe during the war and also served on the staff of V Corps. After the war Colonel Kintner attended Georgetown University, studying Geopolitics and international relations. He is the author of *The Front Is Everywhere* (\$3.75), a study of "militant communism in action," published by the University of Oklahoma Press. He is now on duty in Washington.

rean Reds routed the poorly armed Republic of Korea forces. The chaos and disorganization of retreat left no time to sow minefields, demolish bridges or devise tank traps. U.S. units hastily thrown into action were not fully prepared to withstand the armored attack. There were obvious deficiencies in training and equipment.

None of the elements of an effective antitank weapons system was initially present and the rolling hills of central Korea became tank highways rather than tank traps.

In the resentment against our repeated losses, the significance of our tankless forces in the field struck the American people and a hue and cry arose for tanks and more tanks. Many of the Army's armor advocates led the swing with the axiomatic statement that the best antitank weapon is a tank. Even if the matter were limited to the issue of stopping a single tank, this appears highly questionable. The outcome of a tank duel would to a large degree depend on who fired first. It could depend on the tactical situation as well. A tank on the defense, in a dug-in position, for example, has an advantage over an attacking tank that must silhouette itself against the skyline as it seeks out its opponent. This same advantage accrues to the more mobile and less expensive bazooka, utilizing cover and concealment to balance its lack of armor.

WE ARE less concerned, however, with the variety of means available to stop a single enemy tank than with the place of armor in the American military machine. How much of our defense appropriations should be earmarked for armor in view of our strategic commitments abroad? What is the future of armor in the years immediately ahead?

Are tanks the new cure-all for American security that they might have first appeared as we looked over our shoulder at Korea? Before reaching a conclusion, let us briefly examine tank warfare in World War II and then analyze our strategic position in the present unstable world of today.

In France, General Patton's tanks wrote some glorious pages in the history of mobile warfare. Their magnificent dashes electrified the whole world, but these end-runs did not take place until after the German

front had been shattered. In July 1944, Patton's sweeps began when enemy aircraft had been almost entirely driven from the skies and enemy artillery, thinly spread over two massive fronts, was constantly under attack by our Thunderbolt fighters. The breakthrough opened rout conditions which permitted no time for German mining or demolitions. Further, the terrain of northern France was tank country; in fact, it was the birthplace of the tank.

The spinning wheel of war successively brings varying combinations of fire power, armor and mobility to ascendancy. In the brief history of the tank, which has followed this cyclic pattern, Patton's epic brought the tank to the top of the wheel.

Earlier in World War II, German tanks had previously been highly effective against the Allies in France and the Low Countries. But the lessons of the German penetration of the hinge of the Maginot Line was eventually digested by the world. Guderian's blitz was concocted of a balanced combination of tanks and aircraft ideally designed to exploit the transient technical advantage then possessed by armor over fire power.

Against the Soviets, on the other hand, the German armor did not fare as well, especially after the force of the opening aggressive thrusts had been exhausted. It is true, of course, that the panzer divisions made important advances before the Soviets developed matériel and antitank tactics to cope with them. Eventually the Soviets deployed their armies in depth on a massive scale forming the land-island defense system, each island strongpoint almost an army in itself and self-contained. As the Soviet defenses and armor improved, the power of the panzer divisions declined. German armor was able to thrash around in the never-never land between these islands, but was subject to repeated losses all out of proportion to the damage inflicted on the Red forces.

Tanks in the desert played a crucial role. Yet estimates of their value changed almost as rapidly as shifts in the desert war's fortunes between the Afrika Korps and the Allies.

As a general rule tanks used in the jungle and in mountainous terrain were a relatively unsuccessful and unimportant factor. In fact, Churchill summed up their poor showing in

Italy with the flat assertion, "Tanks are finished." This verdict seemed borne out in the subsequent Normandy battle by the failure of British armor to make ground at Caen. Then came the breakthrough and Patton's dash across France. Armor had made good. The misfortunes suffered during the ensuing winter might have erased this opinion had not the final campaign in Germany been so brilliantly sparked by U.S. armored divisions.

THREE facts stand out in assaying the triumphs of U.S. tanks in World War II. They generally were superior in mobility and control but inferior to German tanks in armor plate and guns. Secondly, our tank gains were always made under the protecting umbrella of decisive superiority in tactical air, which often overwhelmed enemy tank defenses. Finally, opposing infantrymen did not possess bazookas or weapons firing shaped-charge shells. Nor were those weapons featured in the defense of France in 1940 or in the see-saw tank battles of the desert. The role they might have played in these battles and against us in our victorious march across France and into Germany cannot be assessed.

Against this survey, let us measure America's requirements for tanks at the present. We're not a nation dedicated to making aggression, but a country dedicated to a world-wide defense against it. We are not planning a surprise attack of hostile lines through which to release hordes of rampaging tanks. If total war replaces limited war, what we will need on land is a means of stopping the tide, the huge Red tide of armor and infantry which may move against us. We must hold this tide from engulfing many peoples all over the world who are not only our friends but our essential allies, all of them needed if we are to win the great struggle. This calls for weapons which can meet the requirements of an initial defense against the vast infantry-tank forces of the enemy. Thousands of relatively inexpensive and highly mobile weapons will be needed to meet this vast world-wide demand. Whatever their individual design, they must collectively comprise an effective antitank weapons system.

Let us look at how such a weapons system might operate. Larger bazookas using the latest ammunition—rockets with shaped charges—are

lethal at short ranges. In the hands of experienced soldiers with the ability and daring to close the range, these bazookas will make it unprofitable for tanks to forage alone where they cannot be protected by cross-fire of their brother tanks, or through overgrown country where the bazooka can lurk behind trees, hedgerows or hillocks.

When massed in open country to protect themselves from the depredations of the bazooka, enemy tanks will fall prey to flexible artillery concentrations and flights of heavily armored, rocket-firing aircraft. If the battle terrain makes them road-bound, they will be stopped by demolitions, mines, and tank traps.

WILL this combination of weapons hold armor at bay? It looked for a time as though the T34 type tanks of the North Koreans were impervious to the bazooka, but the 3.5-inch model quickly exploded this fallacy. The dramatic rush of these weapons to the field only emphasizes the fact that we cannot be lax in forging more effective weapons for the system needed to keep armor chained.

The shaped-charge shell is a nightmare to the world's designers of armor. It can be delivered not only by bazooka, but by artillery and rocket-firing aircraft as well. This effective refinement in the design of the projectile concentrates the force of the explosion in the desired direction, rather than having it expended in all directions equally. It represents a threat to armor which can only be met by much heavier armor plate than any now employed. While the effect of even this projectile can be lessened by inclining the surface of the armor to effect a glancing impact, such inclined surfaces cannot be presented to all projectiles fired frontally, from a flank or from the air. Improved resistance to the penetration of these projectiles might be made by expensive processes which harden the steel surfaces, but at this stage of technical development, the race between explosives and armor seems one-sided. The methods of delivering the explosive forces that man has created have already far surpassed the protection that can easily be afforded by armor plate.

From this we must conclude that in the foreseeable future, tanks will either be extremely heavy, expensive, road-bound, and slow or not really tanks at all but virtually personnel-

and weapons-carriers, providing protection only against small-arms fire.

Fortunately, the weapons system we have briefly described fits the global requirements imposed by a strategy of initial defense. Land mines and demolition equipment are relatively inexpensive and simple to emplace. They are easily transported overseas and can be stockpiled near where they are likely to be used. In contrast to the tank, weapons such as these, if captured by an enemy overrunning our position, could not be transformed into a two-edged sword and used effectively against us while we are on the defensive. The more expensive items in this system such as self-propelled artillery are highly mobile and can be kept in reserve to meet major threats as they develop. Because of their high mobility, unarmored artillery pieces are less susceptible to capture. These are the type of ground defensive weapons that we need now and should concentrate on obtaining in quantities.

THE NATURE of America's armor program must be considered in conjunction with our over-all requirements in tactical air. If we are ever to meet the massed manpower of the Communist empire on anything approaching an equal basis we will need to develop tactical air power far in excess of that available to our forces in Korea. For the initial defensive phase of any future conflict the Army's weapons must be designed to contain the enemy's armor tide on the ground while tactical air delivers the Sunday punch from the sky.

Command of the air is still an essential prerequisite of victory for our forces. (It should be obvious by now that the ratio of our divisions to those of the enemy must also be greatly improved.) Without a guaranteed command of the air, our entire military position will crumble. Yet we cannot simultaneously support a large tank program and a vast tactical air development program. At this critical moment, we should accelerate the production of rocket-armed aircraft capable both of fighting for mastery of the skies and of blasting enemy tank columns before they reach the line of contact. Assigning a relatively low priority to armor is the other side of the tactical air coin.

The expensive tank (in terms of labor and matériel) must wait until our operations are more nearly ready

to use them. Then they can be of the latest style, less vulnerable to the weapons that are lying in wait for them, and specifically designed for the locale where they are to be used.

We do, of course, need tanks today for infantry divisions and armored units already in existence or proposed for early mobilization. These units are designed to use tanks which give them the balanced power needed for tactical flexibility in the defense. But the vast numbers of tanks we may find necessary for a great land offensive should not be bought today. Ample time to manufacture these does not exist. Time can be found for the protracted build-up (a necessary prerequisite to the launching of such an offensive) only if we find means to stabilize the initial defensive line. To build vast numbers of tanks now would be to deny our allies the defensive weapons they so sorely need, and to perpetuate our present critical shortages of tactical aircraft and artillery and bazookas.

AMERICAN industry has the capability of turning out a lot of armor, but the manufacture of a large number of tanks, particularly with industry not geared for full-scale war production, would deprive us of more urgently needed munitions. For every unnecessary tank and its crew we should substitute a rocket-firing aircraft and pilot.

To match the 40,000-odd tanks marshalled by Communists would require hundreds of thousands of men to man them and more to support their effort. Even if we tried to make the tanks and recruit the tankers we would not be able to use them without putting a lot more coal on the fire. Tanks are not flown across oceans as are tactical aircraft; they are not loaded as easily as artillery and bazookas. They have to be deck-loaded on most vessels which can carry only a few. Their large-scale employment would step up our bridging requirements. It would require a great effort to, place them where they could be used. They would also necessitate a very sizable effort to resupply them for they expend great quantities of POL and ammunition.

In a possible war, we will be competing with an enemy who is fighting on interior lines of communication, using relatively short land hauls for resupply instead of transporting it across oceans. A large-scale armored

program would result in our playing the enemy's game with the cards stacked against us. It would be an endeavor of containing him tank for tank rather than skillfully cutting away his strength.

The tank may be an ideal tool for an aggressor. With tanks the aggressor can come thundering into battle against weak forces with no warning when and where he chooses. He will employ them in that way, unless he is opposed by an antitank weapons system capable of blocking this type of power play.

Because the tank is primarily a weapon of the offense, and that its use on the defense is greatly limited and extremely expensive in comparison with other weapons, tanks do not represent the same dividends for American priority-conscious defense dollars.

But even in recognizing its value on the offense, let us also realize that the speed of offensive warfare is ever increasing and threatens to leave the tank, as we know it today, far behind in rapid attacks of the future. Airborne troops, permitting the strategic encirclement and by-passing of strongpoints, may mean more than tanks in tomorrow's war. The tank and anti-tank requirements of airborne forces approximate those of Western armies today. Airlift to haul heavy tanks into the landing area does not exist; yet enemy tanks represent the greatest single hazard to an airborne operation. The period between the initial drop and the establishing of a solid perimeter defense is the most crucial phase of the airborne battle. This initial defense, like the initial strategic defense of the free world, must be compounded from a successful combination of rocket-armed fighters in the sky and lightly but powerfully armed soldiers on the ground. Hence, successful airborne operations may emerge from the same combination of weapons now required to safeguard the free world from Communist armor.

To summarize: A major tank development program at this time would conflict with the more essential tactical air program; would impose added burdens on overlaid logistical supply lines; could not overcome the immense Soviet armor lead; would interfere with the rapid arming of our allies and run counter to the current armor-vs-fire power trend.

So let's take another look before we jump to tanks.

MAKE MINE GI

Captain Joseph R. Edwards

MAYBE it isn't necessary to blow the horn for training films, but if the Army hasn't already done so, I think it's missing a bet by not whipping up films on two subjects hard to sell the recruit: uniform regulations and discipline in formations and drill.

It took two years to convince me that these things weren't fifty per cent chicken and fifty per cent hangover from the whim of some fat general. I finally saw the light.

After VE-day we were pulled back

pass this information to his first sergeant who would then get out of the train, blow his whistle, and get his men with their equipment into formation. Platoon leaders or sergeants then counted off and loaded twenty men to a truck.

Meanwhile, designated noncoms went through the train to make sure every man was out. In a matter of minutes we would be rolling and shortly pull into camp where, in another formation, men were counted off in sixes and assigned to tents. They moved in, dropped their equipment, hit the chow line and the sack.

But what happened with undisciplined and poorly commanded outfits? Very often the CO's car was not marked at all or sometimes only on one side. So we had to board the train and search for him. A sleepy GI would tell us he didn't know where the CO was but the first sergeant was in the next car. Finally you would find the sergeant who would tell you that Major Bonedome had left the car early in the morning. At your suggestion the sergeant would start looking.

Meanwhile the troops would pile off the train. Soon the word was spread that they are at their destination. You stand helplessly by while at least thirty men climb into the first truck and more claw at the next three. Then one of the first men, now crowded right up against the cab of a truck suddenly remembers he got off the train just to find out what was going on and has left all of his equipment behind. He digs out through the other twenty-nine men and takes off for the train. The door is jammed with men coming out so he has to wait until they pass. He finally gets into the car but there's no equipment there. Some of his buddies have taken it off for him.



into France to run a processing camp for the Havre port. Troops from all over ETO came through. I was camp motor officer and met incoming troop trains and transported the men to the camp. We knew the number of men on each incoming train and had the trucks there waiting.

The SOP was that the car in which the train commander rode would have that fact chalked conspicuously on it. On arrival no one would leave the train until ordered to do so. Thus with a trained, well commanded and disciplined outfit the mechanics of the operation were simple. We would board the CO's car, tell him he'd reached his destination and that we had trucks waiting and wanted twenty men per truck. The CO would

CAPTAIN JOSEPH R. EDWARDS, Infantry, USAR, is a World War II veteran and lives in Confluence, Pa.

MAJOR Bonedome has now been located in a bedroll the size of a vinegar barrel and he is in no hurry to leave it. Some urging convinces him that he ought to. So he crawls out and spends the next twenty minutes finding and lacing his unauthor-



ized paratrooper boots, searching for his equipment and yelling for his orderly to roll up his sack. But the orderly is among the men already on the trucks.

The first sergeant then attempts to take over. He orders the unit to fall out. Bedlam ensues. "Where do you want us, Sergeant?" one guy yells. "Do we bring our equipment or leave it on the trucks?" somebody else hollers.

Major Bonedome has now shown up on the scene but is busy supervising the stowing of his bedroll and loot bag in, of course, overcrowded truck No. 1. He begins to throw a little rank and growls at the first sergeant, "Are we ready to move out, Sergeant? Let's get this thing organized." Then he turns back to the stowage of his bedroll, moving two men out to make room for it.

After twenty minutes there is a formation of sorts. Then the word is passed that Szweczyk is missing. Soon it's discovered that several others besides Szweczyk are not accounted for. Back into the train goes the sergeant to find them sleeping in a bunk they have made by knocking a couple of seats apart.

In about forty-five minutes the troops are entrucked and ready to roll. It seems like a good idea to have Major Bonedome ride in the lead jeep with you so that you can give him some poop and avoid confusion at the camp. But you find him snoozing like a sawmill, in the cab of a truck. So you go through another Chinese fire drill at the campsite.

A few experiences like this will make a believer out of even the most free critic of military discipline.

AS to uniform regulations and personal appearance—who is qualified to tell me how to wear my clothing or cut my hair? I've been getting along right well for twenty-five years without any such advice.

I was convinced of this until I went on several leaves to Paris. It seemed like every GI in the ETO was there. Hoping to see someone from home I stationed myself at a sidewalk café and watched the stream of men go by. I must have looked at thousands of soldiers, but no luck—never saw a familiar face. But my belief in tough uniform regulations was cinched.

Most men were properly dressed. But occasionally some sharp carp whose ideas were better than the Army's, and different from head to toe, would slouch by and my respect for the uniform I was wearing plunged lower than a Parisienne model's neckline. Here comes one with paratrooper boots, pegged OD pants, form-fitting, finger-tip blouse prob-



ably altered in exchange for some rations, a Windsor knot in his tie and a horribly crushed garrison cap at a rakish angle. Behind him came the casual type—blouse wide open, tie pulled comfortably down, garrison cap shoved on the back of his head, unpressed trousers with the top button of the fly missing, but helped out by a length of web belt not only closing the gap but dangling a foot or so.

Now a horse-opera hero. His sideburns are long, chisel-pointed jobs that end just opposite the mouth and between them a moth-eaten mustache daubed with something like Shinola. He wears an officer's overseas cap, less braid, but with insignia at a precarious angle. He sports a highly polished brass whistle, complete with braided red, white and blue cord. The blouse is GI but that has been remedied by unit patches, Hershey bars, and pfc stripes attached with a tricky cross-stitching of violent yellow cord.

Another guy comes around the

corner. No flash for this geezer. Keep it plain, he always says. If it weren't for the fact that the clothes are obviously not new you might think they were issued yesterday. No piping on the cap, no branch-of-service insignia, no nothing. You have seen his type before, or you wouldn't know whether he was soldier, civilian technician, DP, or war correspondent.

Now comes the reason for the GI haircut. He is a beautiful boy. His hair is long, wavy and well oiled, with each lock placed in exactly the right place. On the sides it is full and flowing and brushed carefully to the rear, all but concealing his ears. But the masterpiece is at the nape of the neck, the crowning glory of the coiffeur. With loving care and precision the ends have been tenderly overlapped to give much the same appearance as the west end of a well fed horse. Topping this is an overseas cap with points like inverted ice-cream cones. It is perched on the left because to cock it to the right would ruin the hairdo. A final divine touch is a yellow scarf peering out at the throat.

THE next guy is full field. The uniform in itself is passable but slung from the left shoulder is a musette bag stuffed to the brim. From the other shoulder hangs a camera with flash attachment and around the neck a pair of field glasses. Clamped around his waist is a pistol belt to which are attached: Sun glasses w/ case; light meter; Boy Scout knife; raincoat. Protruding from both hip pockets are newspapers and other data and his chest is bumpy from the wads of maps, souvenir programs, notebooks and postcards protruding from his shirt pockets.

Then the rugged boy—the character who is tough and wants everybody to know it—rolls into sight like a sailor from a tavern. His shirt is torn open to expose a hairy chest and his necktie is hanging near the right shirt pocket. The forty-eight-hour beard is emphasized by a man-sized wad of eatin' tobacco, replenished from the pack sticking out of his hip pocket.

I know the arguments. A uniform doesn't help a soldier shoot straight—and some of the sloppiest were the best combat soldiers. But after seeing the things some guys can do to a uniform, for my money and in my outfit I'll take mine GI.



INVESTIGATION



DRIVER TESTING



VEHICLE INSPECTION

How One Outfit Got It

THE speeding truck skidded into the curve. As his truck whipped crazily the driver caught a fleeting glance of the Upatoi Creek bridge and realized that his momentum was going to carry him into it. He swung his front wheels toward the skid. Now he was in real trouble. Zig-zagging crossways of the road and broadside to the bridge, the truck careened close to

the concrete abutment. A sturdy pine abruptly stopped all forward movement. The driver, unharmed, groggily shook his head and surveyed the damage. Later, when the pro-rated cost was entered on his pay card, he learned that repairs to the front fender, bumper, gear-housing, body and bed were nearly \$500.

The accident rate of the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion for the first nine months of the year (1949) had been 1.37 per 100,000 driven miles against an overall Army rate of 1.7. In October of that year the rate rose to 4.02. On a post where a unit drives 200,000 miles a month, the effect of this increase upon the post rate as a whole can be appreciated.

The safety program of the 52d

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WALDON C. WINSTON, Infantry, is the commanding officer of the 52d Transportation Truck Battalion, now in Korea. While commanding the battalion at Fort Benning he developed an antiAWOL program which was described in the March 1950

INFANTRY JOURNAL.



Go to

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL

RIVING



SAFE DRIVER AWARDS



SAFETY MEETINGS



COMMAND SUPERVISION

Lieutenant Colonel Waldon C. Winston


Transportation Truck Battalion included the usual Army directives, safety posters, driver training, periodic maintenance checks, accident reports, investigation of accidents, safety meetings on company level and disciplinary action. But this wasn't enough.

We were confronted with the task of "finding, naming and correcting the conditions and circumstances that cause accidents." A survey of our safety program, driver training and supervision was at once interesting and revealing.

At the outset, we found that vehicles were properly dispatched. We had very few late dispatches. Unfavorable reports of MPs and safety patrols were negligible. With few ex-

ceptions the vehicles were operated properly and for official purposes. Motor vehicle operator permits were issued in accordance with Regulations.

Maybe there was a weakness in our selecting, testing and training procedures. We began to emphasize selection and training. However, we were limited by heavy dispatch commitments and, as general reserve units, were required to keep one company continuously in training. Motor vehicle operator permits were suspended and drivers grounded for cause, but our follow-through—or lack of it—before reissuance had allowed a few drivers to get by. We found several drivers in one company with physical defects that disqualified them. Re-



check of qualifications after one year had been neglected.

The Infantry School has an excellent driving course, and this was available to our unit for testing and training drivers. Remedial and refresher training included emphasis on specific weaknesses, such as distances in convoy, backing, turning and halts and post traffic regulations.

The post safety director kept us well supplied with posters, photographs, publications and other training data.

Inquiry revealed that only accidents involving claims against the government were being investigated and that emphasis was directed more toward determining liability than on discovering fundamental causes. Before investigation was completed months had flitted away and corrective action was impossible—in some cases the driver had been transferred.

Failure to report all accidents had some repercussions. In one unreported accident an officer accepted settlement on the spot from the government driver. However, both had overlooked the MP standing by who made an official report. After that all drivers were instructed to report all accidents regardless of circumstances.

WE were able to organize an inspection team (as provided by the T/O). Composed of three enlisted men, who checked a certain number of vehicles daily on the road and in

the motor pool, their inspections were pro-rated so that we had one hundred per cent coverage of all unit vehicles every thirty days. The daily spot checks were on my desk about 1600 each day, and after I saw them they were returned to the motor pool through channels for remedial action. Also, each driver got a copy of the inspection *on the spot*, so that he could take corrective action on items covered by driver maintenance. Drivers without deficiencies got three-day


passes beginning the next day, regardless of how heavy the dispatch was. The best company for one month was awarded the "Best Vehicles" plaque to hold for thirty days.

We developed a special way of handling drivers involved in motor vehicle accidents involving primary accident causes. This provided complete publication of all circumstances and preventive measures, and remarkable results were obtained—without court-martial action.

Most accidents are due to faulty training and improper supervision. Why court-martial a man to cover up command deficiencies? The driver was recruited to be made into a soldier and not to fill the GI stockade with paying guests.

I have mentioned the pass bonus and the Best Vehicles plaque. Most important of all we devised a chart for recording accidents, maintenance deficiencies, traffic violations and commendations. This chart served as a scoreboard, giving recognition to outstanding drivers and indicated the accident status of the unit.

Other means of stimulating interest in a comprehensive program for preventing motor vehicle accidents included: Monthly meetings at battalion and company level, posters, photographs, bulletins and charts, newspaper and post publications, payroll inserts such as used by industry, driv-



er interviews, courts of inquiry or review following accidents, pass bonus, preference of vehicles and dispatches.

To insure that all personnel understood that we meant business, we prepared a safety SOP which everyone was required to follow.

COMPLIANCE with the established SOP required that all echelons within the battalion become acutely aware of deficiencies which adversely affected our operating efficiency. The troops were kept informed.

Administrative procedure involved coordinating with all operational units—regulating station, provost marshal, safety director and using agencies. So much emphasis was placed on the fundamentals of safe driving as outlined in the *Driver's Manual* that one Infantry School instructor reported that a driver-corporal assembled the truck drivers in a safety meeting while the School students they had transported to the field attended a problem. When the students dismounted the corporal asked the instructor for permission to "hold a meeting of the drivers near the trucks."

Giving his assent the instructor watched the corporal assemble the drivers, pull the *Driver's Manual* from his pocket, read a paragraph from it, then asked each man in turn just what it meant. As discussion was completed on each paragraph, the corporal continued to the next.

When they came to the paragraph on drinking and driving, the corporal solemnly announced, "Gasoline and alcohol don't mix!"

"Now, Jones, what does that mean to you?"

"To me it means if you are driving and drinking in Columbus, Georgia, it's a \$101.00 fine!"


"Case, what does it mean to you?"

"It means if you aren't driving, it's a \$50.00 fine."

That was a safety meeting!

WE began conducting our own investigations of all accidents to determine the primary cause. This gave us a basis for corrective action and preventive measures. We cooperated with public officials and civic clubs and local industry in bringing the accident prevention message before their membership and supervisors.

Command supervision continued to



At safety meetings a driver who had been in an accident would explain (with the aid of visual aids) how his accident happened and how he thought he might have prevented it.

emphasize the importance of maintenance and repair of vehicles to insure safe performance at all times.

With the aid of the battalion safety officer, staff, company officers, non-commissioned and enlisted personnel, we developed a formula for our battalion safety meetings that sustained the interest and enthusiasm of the drivers and prevented accidents.

All battalion meetings were held at night on the men's time. This was done deliberately. It was impossible to assemble the battalion in the daytime and I wanted them to sacrifice something in the interest of accident prevention. After the first meeting (in November 1949) when I explained that I was willing to give up twelve hours of my own time during the next year to prevent even one fatality in the battalion, I haven't heard a grumble. When I asked if anyone present objected to giving that much individual time to save a buddy's life—or his own—not a hand was raised. I told them the meeting would start at 1900 and would be over at 2000. That promise was kept.

BEFORE each meeting, the safety officer and I went over the program. Parts of it were prepared by other officers who coordinated their plans with the safety officer. We always urged the chaplain to attend and allowed him up to five minutes to talk to the men on safety from his point of view. Once we had him lead us in

a short memorial service.

The safety officer would take his chart and give a résumé of the post and battalion accident record (see charts).

"This solid line shows accidents per month for the battalion," he would say. "The dotted line shows The Infantry Center. Where the solid line and the dotted line hit a peak is an indication that something caused our accident rate to go up in one particular month. These accidents are figured on vehicle-miles driven. If we have less mileage in one month and the same number of accidents, the frequency rate will be higher."

After the safety officer had completed his talk the post safety director would take over. He would continue in the same vein as the battalion safety officer, using the visual aid of the accident and injury rate charts to make his points.

The most interesting part of the program now began. Drivers who had had accidents were interviewed by the safety officer. This was not for disciplinary purposes (as we made clear) but to point out the mistakes.

Each man explained with the help of visual aids—an enlarged chart showing position of vehicles and road—how his accident happened. After a few pertinent questions concerning speed, brakes, condition of road, and so on, each driver was asked how he thought he could have prevented the accident. From the answers the five hundred listeners had

pounded home to them such things as obeying speed limits, being careful on turns and in backing. The men formed their own conclusions from the description of each accident.

Then came the yogi. With the help of a crystal ball, he predicted such things as no more accidents in 1950—no more late dispatches, while the audience shuddered with glee.

Our safety meetings lasted exactly one hour. They were planned and timed so that no speaker was on the platform more than five minutes. Even the post safety director was warned that we would lower the boom if he attempted to take more than his allotted time on statistics. Rehearsals were brief—because accidents are not rehearsed. We wanted our thespians to act natural. If we departed from military dignity, it didn't seem to reflect upon our discipline. After all, there is no dignity about an accident—regardless of rank or grade.

It was an à la carte program based on selection of accident causes which needed immediate and corrective action. Our skits were used to emphasize certain conditions and how accidents can be prevented.

As a result of this concentration on the cause and prevention of accidents, we achieved the results shown in the charts. Also the average cost per vehicular accident was reduced by thirty-one per cent. The cumulative vehicular accident rate for the first six months of 1950 was 1.28 against an average rate of 1.88 for 1949 or a reduction of 32 per cent. Other improvements were noted in vehicular maintenance which was well below Third Army minimum requirements.

I HAVE read that the onus of excessive accidents rests upon the safety officer. I deny this. The onus is squarely upon the shoulders of the commander and cannot be delegated. In AR 385-10, the commander is given a discretionary responsibility based on the assumption that he will take some positive constructive action.

To me SR 385-155-1 seems to indicate that AR 385-10 has a basic weakness. Some unit commanders have failed to activate this discretionary premise. If the individual soldier rewards your inquiry about the accident-prevention program in his unit with a lackluster "uh" it seems fair to assume that his immediate superiors have read SR 385-155-1 with the same

degree of native intelligence.

We cannot accept the soldier at his parade-ground best and deny him at his stockade worst—unless he has reached the status of a DD, BCD, or undesirable. He is our full responsibility. Off-duty accidents reduce our efficiency, affect our available manpower and reflect upon our leadership. We must accept responsibility for the disciplinary deficiencies of conduct as well as the curtain calls and parade performance. Ours is no à la carte responsibility in which we can take it or leave it. Accident prevention is a responsibility that cannot be denied by unit commanders when it is in their power to prevent this sacrificial cost of life and property.

For those who have felt that they are doing everything reasonably possible to prevent accidents I want to say that what I have written here in a critical vein is meant to be constructive. I have heard it said that the methods I have described concentrate on a few objectives and could affect the over-all balance. I don't think that is at all true. There must be a central point of attack to any problem. Prevention of accidents must deal with the immediate conditions and circumstances out of which similar accidents occur and which affect operating efficiency. Common sense dictates that preventive effort be directed toward the thing most easily and quickly corrected. In *Industrial Accident Prevention* I read: "It is clear that in case of an accident and injury resulting from an unsafe act, the unsafe act immediately precedes an accident; and, if it is removed . . . the action of any one or all of the factors that precede the accident will be ineffective. Therefore, the logical direction of safety work should be toward the elimination of similar unsafe acts." Only by a concentration of effort can results be obtained.

When I estimate that I may fail in my primary mission because some limited objective interferes, must I sit helplessly on my tail because my mission failed to outline this particular situation? Such an attitude would not be tolerated in American industry. It would be intolerable in war. How crowded will be the straggler line! How empty the foxholes in combat if we can't correct these conditions in peace. Accident prevention means efficiency. Without one we cannot have the other.

CROSSED CANNONS

MAJOR WILLIAM G. PATTERSON

The gunnery projection kit developed by the Artillery School is a natural for civilian component artillery units that want to give their forward observers practice.

THE mission of the artillery observer is to place the fire power of his and other units where it will do the Infantry the most good. The artillery can't do the job if the forward observer can't shoot. And he won't be a shooter if he can't practice. He can't practice if his opportunities are confined to a couple of missions a year at a summer camp, or an occasional "refresher" course at The Artillery School.

Since the introduction of the target grid system of fire direction, and the removal of s, r, c/d, r/R, and a whole bookful of rules-of-thumb from the conduct of fire, many artillerymen pooh-pooh service practices. "Nothin' to it, practice isn't needed," they insist.

However, statistics show that approximately five per cent of the students in the 1949-50 advanced class at The Artillery School racked up big, fat horseshUUU's.

Approximately two thousand missions were fired by the class. That means that about a hundred of them were unsatisfactory. In combat that would mean a lot of dead joes—and they likely wouldn't be Uncle Joe's minions.

The Department of Gunnery was quick to realize this deficiency. The 1950-51 class is going to fire almost twice as many missions as the last with service ammunition. It also will receive many more hours of indoor instruction on what used to be called the terrain board. It isn't called that

NOT CROSSED FINGERS

now, but rather the gunnery projection kit—and therein lies the point of this story.

GUNNERY instructors have long been plagued with the problem of indoor "service practice." The evolution of ideas and gadgets has included blackboards, match-box problems, Bishop trainers, and a wide variety of manufactured and home-made terrain boards. Likely the newest and most widely used is the 14 feet by 14 feet job which currently is sold through the Book Department, TAS, for the tidy little sum of \$365.

Each has had its capabilities and its limitations—with a preponderance of the latter. The lack of realism was the most detrimental. The big \$365 model approaches realism with "smoke" puffs for bursts, accurate scales on which to set data, and a rather realistic view of terrain. However, its size, cost, and frequent smoke troubles are obvious deficiencies.


The training aids branch of the Division of Training Publications, TAS, long has been developing the idea of photographic projection of all sorts of charts, maps, and other training aids for classroom instruction. When confronted with the gunnery observed-fire problem, it naturally went to work on a projection method.

There is no better representation of actual terrain than a photo of it. The same applies to a shell burst. The job has to put them together in the sequence of a normal fire mission.

The initial development was designed for the projection of 35mm slides which portrayed the terrain with shell burst and the reticle of field glasses superimposed thereon. This method was very satisfactory—for a problem or two—but still not the answer.

Preparation of the slides was an intricate art job. Ten to fifteen slides were necessary to portray one fire mission. In a short time the students had the problems memorized and it became apparent that it would take hundreds of slide sets in order to get away from the canned aspect of the missions.

Another serious fault lay in the fact



that the student was forced to give the proper sensing and correction before the next slide was shown in order to have the bursts appear in the proper place.

By the time these difficulties were coming to light, the Visual Aids Section had come up with another idea which, in spite of its infancy, seems to be pretty close to the ultimate answer.

It is called the gunnery projection kit and comes prepared for use with two different types of projectors—the Balopticon and the Visual Cast (or Vu-graph). Many small units are issued one or the other. The kits are available through the Book Department, TAS, for only \$7.50 for the Balopticon projector, and \$5.75 for the Visual Cast.

Operation of the device by the gunnery instructor is simple. He takes the corrections announced by the observer, visualizes where that corrections would throw the next burst, and places the burst there. Similar to a match-box or blackboard problem.

It is another matter of superimposition, except that the bursts are movable. Either impact or air bursts may be obtained at will, and appear on the screen in an exceptionally realistic manner. Therefore, the student sees his rounds where he calls for them—and not in some predetermined position.

The kit for the Balopticon, for instance, includes a wooden slide in

which two identical photos of terrain are inlaid under glass. The reticle of field glasses is superimposed upon both photos. One photo is projected onto the screen, the target is assigned, and the initial fire request is sent by the student.

The instructor places small "dolls," representing bursts, upon the other photo in the appropriate place, sends "On the Way," and reverses the position of the photos. The student then sees his round or volley on the terrain as it would appear to him through field glasses.

After a brief glimpse, the photos are reversed again and his new corrections set up, and so on. The dolls are of different shapes and sizes to depict varying ranges, heights of bursts, and effects. The photos of terrain may be changed after each problem to represent another portion of the "firing range."

The angle T remains the same regardless of the position of the students in the room, which is a considerable improvement over the old terrain boards. All students should obtain the same sensings for each round.

Civilian components and small units are taking to it like a duck takes to water. It is cheap, can be used under almost any conditions of classroom space or class size, and it makes observer practice available to almost any officer.

Practice makes perfect. There now is no reason for an observer entering combat to cross his fingers and wish a round onto the target.

The Mobilization Recipe

Lieutenant Colonel C. V. Clifton

GETTING this nation to a state of readiness is like baking a loaf of bread. The cook has to have all the ingredients; none can be left out. They all have to be mixed in the right order and amount. And when it's done, we want it to taste good, and we don't want it to cost too much.

Bread-bakers Marshall, Bradley & Company believe they are doing the best they can in putting together the mobilization recipe, but when it's done it may taste more like hardtack than bread. But it will be our steady diet for years, so they want it to be durable and vital, and something we can afford year after year. That's probably why the Department of Defense seems to be getting on with mobilization slower than some people would like.

Luckily, we have a good recipe and some experienced cooks. We have military men who were on the teams that did the same job ten years ago, when we were much less prepared than today. On the civilian side, we have men who in 1940 and 1941 were either mobilization "Chiefs" or lesser staff "Indians." Behind the two is the sound backlog of elder statesmen: Baruch, Byrnes, Patterson, and many others. The cook book, judging from the frequent references to it before committees of Congress and in public statements, is the *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army 1943 to 1945, to the Secretary of War*.

In the Defense Department, General Marshall and Deputy Secretary Lovett draw daily upon their experi-

The cooks and bakers in the Pentagon have mixed a carefully blended and balanced loaf that will sustain and strengthen us

ences of getting ready for World War III. They are trying to mobilize our industrial and military resources in an orderly, step-by-step process—in a way that will give us a sound, broad base or expansion if it comes to an all-out war.

Today's situation differs dramatically from our earlier experiences. Industry has many management chiefs and engineers who have been through every step of the great transition from civilian to defense production. Many weapons they must now produce were produced in the war. Even some of the same tools and dies can be put to work. Industry learned once, a short while ago, to apply mass production to intricate weapons, and to modify models as battle experience proved the need. It has engineers and designers who are as familiar with tank turrets as with the semi-trailer connections of ten-ton tractors.

The pattern of turning recruits into combat men is familiar to many officers and noncommissioned officers of all three services. The use of our military school system to make accounting executives into battalion commanders, and college students into four-engine pilots, is not a new problem. Besides, on 30 June 1939, the Army and its Air Corps consisted of 14,486 officers and 174,079 men, for a total of 188,565. Even these were not organized into units as large as divisions and wings.

But on 30 June 1950, five days after Korea began, the Army alone had 72,566 officers and 518,921 enlisted men

—591,487 altogether—including ten divisions, plus four infantry regiments, four regimental combat teams, four armored regiments and many separate battalions of supporting troops. The Navy and the Air Force had similarly broad bases upon which to mobilize.

General J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, has assured us that by 30 June 1951—just one year later—the Army will comprise the equivalent of twenty-four divisions plus an unannounced increase in battalions and supporting troops. The Air Force had approximately forty-eight groups in 1950 and will have some seventy groups. The Navy mobilization rate is not so apparent from the increase in the number of ships, but the Navy and the Marine Corps are keeping pace with, and may even be ahead of, the other two services in combat readiness, of needed forces.

No one is complacent about these facts and figures. All hands know the mobilization job is a tough one, that building the Armed Forces to three and a half million men and improving the readiness of all reserve components is a tremendous task. But the planned twelve-month expansion on the broad base from which we started should be remembered by those who think mobilization has been too slow.

If the tenor of Congressional questions and remonstrances is a guide, the American people want an even faster mobilization. Senators and Representatives have steadily urged a faster pace, and even greater expenditures if they are needed. To an ex-

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tent, that urging comes from lack of comprehension of the program already in the works.

IT is customary to measure mobilization progress by the number of men in the Armed Forces. Our citizens look back at the sixteen million men in uniform at the end of World War II—the eighty-nine divisions which had been committed to combat, to the Air Corps of 63,000 planes, the Navy of 50,000 ships and landing craft, all 100 per cent manned and equipped.

But Defense officials and mobilization chiefs say that putting great numbers into uniform right away would be a big mistake—the cart before the horse. We must have a partial mobilization of industry first.

Industrial mobilization is the key to long-term strength. We must convert to defense production to replace materials we have used up in Korea; to equip the three and a half million men we are mobilizing; to build the weapons reserves and defense material reserves needed in case of war.

The Defense view of mobilizing industry first—on a broad base—has two guiding principles. Whatever we create in defense, industry must have a sense of permanency about it. And whatever defense industry we create must be readily expandable.

Our defense industry must have a sense of permanency, because *threat* of war may continue for ten or twenty years. We simply don't know when another enemy may start another world war. Korea is an indication that imperialist communism will not hesitate to resort to war to gain its ends. We hope the delay will be so long that we can build up enough armed strength in the free world to deter anyone from starting a new war. We know the grand prize is the rest of Europe. If communism can add those peoples and their industrial potential to Soviet Russia's, the balance of economic and military industrial power would probably tip in their favor.

The second principle, that whatever defense industry we create must be a sound base for ready expansion, is an-

other reason for getting industry going ahead of putting men into uniform. Right today, we could produce the equipment we need for the war in Korea, and for our Armed Forces elsewhere, by stopping all other production and, as rapidly as possible, turning out the required munitions and equipment. But if this could be done, say, in a year, and no war came, then we would have converted most of our industry, and there would be a wide gap in production while we tried to convert partly back to civilian production. The disruption caused by conversion and reconversion would double our economic trouble.

The Pentagon also believes that a mobilization followed by a demobilization would be a terrible mistake. It would be tremendously expensive. In the end it wouldn't increase our military power one iota. Such an up-and-down of industrial and armed strength would moreover, shatter confidence in our leadership among free nations the world around.

Going step by step, converting as much of each industry as needed, even if it takes a little longer to produce all that we and our allies need, is the safe, sure way.

FOR a completely hypothetical case, let's take the television industry, now running full tilt. It must also produce electronic and radar gear for the Armed Forces. TV factory No. 1 has three assembly lines. To meet our first needs, we convert one of those to radar equipment, and we divert enough materials and men to run it, and we train enough men to run it on a one-shift basis. If this isn't quite enough, we convert one line in TV factory No. 2, in some other part of the country, also on a one-shift basis.

Now when the need for a second step-up comes, we put the line in factory No. 1 on a three-shift basis, and it turns out two and one-half times as much as it did before. For the next, we put the line in factory No. 2 on a three-shift basis. We are now producing, in very short order, five times what we were. And as we need to, we can go on from there.

Thus we have tapped the skilled manpower in two different areas. As the second and third production lines are required, the more experienced men can rise as foremen and skilled technicians. In case of bombings, the whole electronic production won't be knocked out in one blow.

This is a rough example of what Defense officials mean when they talk of their orderly plan for mobilization of industry on a readily expandable base. It is true that some industries are already running full capacity in three shifts just to meet present needs. In these, our first requirements have to be met by cutting back civilian consumption, but for the long pull the industry itself has to be enlarged. I have heard some men in the petroleum industry indicate that this may soon be necessary in order to meet their defense expansion requirements.

THE other side of mobilization is the military power that follows industrial mobilization, and builds with it. The brief summary of progress in the making between July 1950 and the same date this year, outlined earlier, shows how much better off we are for expansion now than we were in 1941.

But two questions still persist in the minds of many of us, soldiers and civilians: Are these goals set high enough? Is mobilization of manpower going fast enough?

Beyond the twenty-four divisions, and seventy groups, and the Navy and Marine programs, the next goals to follow have only been hinted at. The 3.5-million man limit is all we have on the record for the moment.

In testifying before the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Bradley said:

It is the responsibility of your military advisers to recommend to you a sound long-range plan for the mobilization of the armed strength of this country—one which will maintain the security of this nation, and fulfill our international commitments.

One recommendation which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently made is for a long-range military policy

which does not shift its balance, or rise and fall with temporary changes in the foreign situation.

Those who feel that the successful solution to one conflict may give us the opportunity to relax and stay out of all the succeeding ones fail to recognize the avowed intent of communist doctrine. We are face to face with a long-range struggle—a struggle in which the enemy will use all means—political, economic, psychological, and military—to bring about our capitulation. This long-range struggle is a struggle for survival of our nation, and of all the freedom it means to us and to the rest of the world.

We believe that our long-range defense measures must include: Forces in being to avert disaster and to retaliate in case we are attacked; and a mobilization machinery in the Armed Forces and in industry which can be thrown into high gear if we face an all-out war. Obviously, our long-range program must be within our national means; and it must be consistent with the attitudes of the American people toward their own defense. The American people have never maintained in peacetime and do not intend to maintain now, forces in being large enough to win a major war.

Our basic strength consists of two main elements: Our military power and the tremendous industrial power we can mobilize. Both of these require trained manpower. In any mobilization—including the partial mobilization in which we are now engaged—the two requirements conflict to some extent. We are trying to fit our recommendations for manpower for the Armed Forces into a plan which takes cognizance of the need for men in industry.

Let me again refer to our specific military objectives: To create the power to prevent disaster in the event we are attacked; to have in hand the immediate capability of quick and strong retaliation to the attacker; and finally, to have a base upon which to build an overwhelming force, with which we can take up the offensive and overpower the aggressor.

From an Army point of view, there is little real danger now of the continental United States being invaded and overrun as far as we can see.

From an Air Force point of view, our program, coupled with the efforts of the Canadians will provide such air defense that complete disaster will not overtake us. This does not mean that

we believe that the air forces we recommend will preclude any possibility of this country being bombed. If a determined enemy is willing to expend the effort, some bombers will get through. In our planning for defense, and for civil defense, we must recognize this possibility and provide for meeting it.

From a Navy point of view, the sea forces we are recommending will be able to carry out their missions to avert disaster to this country.

In addition to maintaining sufficient forces in being to stave off national military calamity, we are trying to provide a force that can retaliate immediately—a force that can hurt the enemy, slowing down both the strength and tempo of his attack upon us while our mobilization gets under way. The nature of this retaliation force changes with the conditions of war and the weapons of war. It is almost redundant to point out that the shape and form of our retaliatory forces have changed materially since World War II.

The initial retaliation against an enemy by strategic bombing will be provided if the air power and the necessary Army and Navy support to seize and hold the bases from which to operate, are in our hands the moment an emergency arises. The closer the bases are to the enemy the easier it will be, and the less costly it will be, to provide a sustained retaliation air attack. Our strategy does not include a retraction of all of our military power to the continental limits of the North American continent when we are attacked.

As a third requirement, our forces in being must include a sufficient mobilization base so that if necessary we can push the throttle of mobilization forward and expand our forces efficiently and quickly to meet the threats, and eventually to take the offensive against the attacking enemy.

This third requirement—a broad base of strength from which we can expand—is probably the most important of them all. Heretofore broad oceans and strong allies have protected us during mobilization. Next time, the clouds of war may give little warning and we may have no time for this third important part of our security.

When we discuss the mobilization base, we include the National Guard and the Reserve forces which are traditionally the backbone of the United States' defense. The regular forces contribute to the military training and

educational facilities which are necessary for the expansion, and furnish the cadres for those divisions, ships, and air groups that will be called for in all-out mobilization. But we must shorten the time before our reserve components are ready for combat.

THE Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended to the President and to the Congress that about 3.5 million men in uniform are necessary to meet the present threat as far as they can foresee. They have said that any time the situation changes for the worse they would have to ask for more men and women on active duty. Throughout the manpower hearings, the Defense Department witnesses have stressed the need for a better state of readiness for the *reserve components* as necessary adjuncts to our security provisions.

But basically the combined mobilization planned for must provide these things: the men and materials to continue the effort in Korea; the same to fulfill present world-wide commitments including the occupation tasks, and support for the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty; the increase in our Armed Forces now planned, including additional air forces in 1952; and, finally, war reserves of equipment that have been somewhat depleted by the Korean fighting.

Men without equipment cannot meet security needs. So there is first emphasis on industrial mobilization, with a simultaneous development of a manpower program to give us a well trained reserve for years and years to come.

If all-out war hit us tomorrow, then perhaps ten million men in uniform might be desirable. But ten million men or six million men, or even three million men, would not avert disaster, nor make us able to retaliate, nor form a sound basis for mobilization without the weapons and the ammunition to fight. For the long pull, war or no war, our industry has to be set in order to deliver the materials. Manpower must be applied to this task first, and in such a way that it can be maintained through the years of international uncertainty.



JUST DETAILS . . .

OF INFANTRY-ARTILLERY COOPERATION

As an oasis of firm knowledge in a desert of distortion and confusion, the Artillery Fire Direction Center can give a commander accurate information on what is happening on his battlefield.

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Hayes

EVERYBODY agrees that the infantry and artillery must cooperate. Everybody also agrees that cooperation is a command responsibility. And, that the commander handles this responsibility through liaison officers from the artillery to the combat team headquarters and to the headquarters of the infantry battalions.

That's the big picture. But the little picture of this cooperation at work is what wins battles. The big principle must be backed up by the action of the men on the ground.

The details, the methods discussed in this article, are techniques only and so are subject to change. I write from the viewpoint of an infantryman.

The commander fighting a battle is constantly beset by lack of information. What he does get is usually distorted in some way. A squad attacked by two enemy soldiers reports a counterattack. The platoon (still attacked by the same two men) reports a counterattack. The company of course take the word of its platoon and reports a counterattack. And so it goes

until some sensible commander along the chain considers the size of the unit from which the information originally came. Consequently, if there is some way an alleged fact can be checked, the commander welcomes it as an oasis of firm knowledge in a desert of distortion. One fine but apparently little used way of checking such facts as location of troops, progress of an advance, size of a counter-attacking force, is through the artillery fire direction center. The center has its finger on the pulse of approximately six forward observer teams, each of them equipped with an excellent radio. These observers are required by their battalions to radio back at periodic intervals. Moreover, before the battalion will fire at any target, it checks and cross checks the location of the infantry troops through its forward observer net.

It was our experience in CT 317 that when the infantry wire was out we could get information quicker through the artillery net than through the infantry net. Even when the infantry wire was in we found that the infantry channels worked only about as fast as and sometimes a little slower than the artillery system did. This was undoubtedly due to the FA observer's direct radio contact with the

fire direction center. The infantry information had to go through the longer channel of platoon-to-company-to-battalion-to-regiment. A further useful piece of information was obtained after the artillery had registered on an enemy position. Part of the enemy position could be exactly fixed because the artillery had surveyed in their positions.

The fire direction center was and always will be a gold mine of information. It should constantly be in the mind of a combat team or task force S-3 as an information source. And the infantry should always remember that FO teams suffer casualties and that their wire and radio communications do not always work, and so should always be ready to relay information to its best friend and helper.

ON THE morning of 12 September, 1944, CT 317 had succeeded in establishing a bridgehead across the Moselle River in the vicinity of Pont-à-Mousson (midway between Metz and Nancy). Previous attempts by other regiments to the north had ended in severe losses. The corps commander was most anxious to hold this important bridgehead. He placed corps

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artillery in support of the regiment through the CT's 313th FA Battalion. The troops dug in and prepared to ward off the counterattacks certain to come.

At 0330 13 September a heavy attack did come. The heavy German artillery concentration and tank support forced a penetration of the regimental front on the left and permitted the German infantry to sweep down to the bridge. A further penetration was made in the center but did not break out. The right of the regimental line was driven back about a kilometer.

The situation was now critical. Successful counterattacks restored the center and a portion of the left. After a violent barrage by nine FA battalions, the right of the line was restored by the 3d Battalion. Losses were extremely heavy in all ranks and all branches. About noon the Germans launched a new and more violent attack at the right of the line. It failed, but only because of an im-


provisation which would land any officer in a nut hatch if he suggested it at one of the service schools.

Artillery fire of nine battalions of artillery was adjusted by the infantry mortar platoon leader (the FO was a casualty) through the following channel: the CO mortars called to the battalion OP via non-T/O SCR-300; the OP called back to battalion headquarters by a different SCR-300; the battalion headquarters contacted CT headquarters by telephone; CT headquarters contacted the artillery fire direction center via a different telephone; the information was passed to the guns by the fire direction center; the "on the way" went back through the same channel. This was a case of ingenuity and improvisation necessitated by casualties and a confused situation. It was done by a system that "couldn't work" (principally because no one had ever tried it). The fire so adjusted was instrumental in

stopping the counterattack which seemed certain to succeed. The loss of the right would have given the enemy a flank position for enfilade fire on the CT's infantry positions. Direct small-arms would have been possible on the 313th FA Battalion positions; the CT headquarters would have been under direct observation. The only bridge across the river could have been brought under small-arms and observed artillery fire. The bridgehead, in short, would have collapsed because the heavy casualties suffered by the CT made strong counter-measures virtually impossible, at least for several days.

THE maintenance of direction during night advances through wooded terrain or through poorly mapped terrain is a difficult problem for the infantry. The artillery is of inestimable value in the solution of this problem. For example, during the cam-

Through its front-line contacts, fire direction centers, such as this Marine Corps installation on Iwo Jima, can be of immense value to the infantry in many ways.



paign in the Saar it became obvious on the third day of fighting that the German resistance on the front of CT 317 was beginning to crumble. If the impetus of the advance could be maintained some sort of breakthrough was bound to occur. To maintain the attack, the infantry battalions were placed in column and leapfrogged forward by a series of flanking actions. These actions were continued during the night.

One battalion was given the mission of advancing through a heavy forest and seizing a town called Waldholzbach. The woods were dense and covered with heavy underbrush. The usual fire breaks were lacking or had been so poorly attended so that they were unrecognizable. Maintenance of direction was exceedingly difficult. The battalion CO recommended stopping until daybreak but this would have meant releasing the pressure on the German defenses.

Someone happened to think of the stars as a method of maintaining direction, but it was too cloudy. But this thought led to the idea of making our own star. The artillery kept firing shells arranged in such a way that they burst at a height of about two hundred yards directly over the point from which the battalion wanted to debouch. This worked like a charm and the battalion was enabled to make an early dawn attack and capture its objective. The attack was such a surprise that German ammunition and supply trains were captured as well as a German headquarters. This proved to be the decisive event on the CT front. Thereafter resistance crumbled and proved negligible until the Rhine River was reached.

It is also true that the artillery may be used to help a unit to locate itself if it gets lost. The artillery is carefully surveyed in and a call to it will bring a shell on any designated point with considerable accuracy—enough to permit a man on the ground to check his position on the map. In keeping with this idea is the use of smoke for various signals. The artillery has smoke shells of various colors. The value of these colored smokes to assist in coordination, marking the taking of objective, for deceptive purposes, and so on, is limited only by the imagination of the commander and his staff. The value in air-ground cooperation is also not to be overlooked.

A major problem in an attack is to maintain the impetus of the attack. The attack must continue moving forward. If it stalls at one point some other place must be found without delay (or better still had been foreseen by prior planning) where an advance is possible. The artillery with its power of concentrating is an admirable weapon for assisting the maintenance of the attack. However, the preparation of a barrage of any duration beginning from scratch is a time-consuming operation. It would be wonderful if a flick of the finger brought down a fully prepared plan of fires. That is almost impossible as is illustrated by the following short battle experience.

DURING the last weeks of January 1945 the final drive to restore the MLR disrupted by the Battle of the Bulge was in progress. CT 317 had been given the mission of advancing along an axis running east-west with the mission of seizing the town of Hosingen. Hosingen was an important road junction through which German troops had to pass in order to retreat across the Sauer River and into the Siegfried Line. To seize Hosingen it was necessary to cross the Clert River. This operation was effected by a brilliant feat of arms enhanced by the bold resolution of Captain Connor who crossed his battalion on a partially frozen crossing site—just like little Eva. The German defenders were driven back rapidly and took up positions to the west of Hosingen. The impetus of the advance was maintained, however, because an artillery fire plan had been made, back to and including the region east of Hosingen. As the infantry elements advanced the concentrations thus rendered useless were simply erased from the plan in a continuous fashion. So, when the attack was finally held up by enemy resistance and delay threatened the fulfillment of the mission an artillery plan was ready.

When the word was given by the CT commander, a coordinated attack was launched within the hour. So surprising was the speed of this attack that Hosingen was captured with practically no casualties (except due to frostbite). The rest of the day and night was spent simply in collecting the German formations coming through the town—all of them completely unaware that it had been cap-


tured. Approximately seventeen hundred prisoners were captured along with numerous weapons and supplies in this operation largely due to the ability of the infantry-artillery team concerned to cooperate in maintaining the impetus of attack.

The planning of an attack from the standpoint of the commander is difficult, in general, because he is unfamiliar with the ground *beyond* what will be the first objective.

The planner must maintain the impetus of the attack for which he should know the character of the ground well into the zone of attack. But he cannot see the zone and consequently must resort to map reconnaissance, which is unsatisfactory. The ground should actually be seen for several objectives ahead in order to plan intelligently.

This is an ideal place for infantry-artillery cooperation. The artillery has liaison planes. These planes in simple language are nothing more or less than movable OPs. You simply move the plane to where you want to look and you have a man-made OP at your service. It was standard practice with CT 317 to have the ground commander and his S-3 fly over the front in an L-4 during the planning phase of an attack. Thus the complete and actual configuration of the ground was known by *personal observation* for many objectives ahead. Time was saved because reconnaissance had been carefully planned. This seems such an obvious use of artillery-infantry cooperation that it is surprising to me that so few units used it. Few if any of the other regiments with which we had contact used this system.

MOST of the examples I have mentioned seem fairly obvious. But, they were not, and they do represent the experiences of many months of combat. The principles of many of these examples will be obviously useful in case of another war and some probably will not be useful. They are, however, avenues along which thoughts can travel—what is at the end of the road is hard to say. One thing is obvious: so much detail and technical knowledge is required of commanders these days that no one officer can possibly learn them all by experience in the short span of life granted to him. We have to learn from other people's experiences.



RECENTLY I heard a man ask, "What's this country Indochina that the Reds are invading? Or have they invaded it?"

They are hard questions to answer. Indochina is not a country. The Communists can't invade it because

they are already there. The war in Indochina is as hot as the war in Korea, but—like the British conflict with the Malayan Chinese communists—it is an unacknowledged and undeclared war.

Indochina is not one country. It is either five countries or three, depending on how you count them. Before World War II, Indochina was a weird colonial composite within the French empire. The direct French colony of Cochin China, inhabited by Annamese, Chinese, French, Cambodians, Siamese, Hindus, and a few Laotians, was owned directly by France just like the island of St. Pierre or French Somaliland. The empire of Annam lay just north of Indochina. It had moved from being a loose Chinese dependency to becoming a very tight dependency instead under French colonial overlordship.

MAJOR PAUL M. A. LINEBARGER, MI-USAR, recently returned to Washington from an extended trip to the Far East. In our January issue he described the current situation in Malaya; in April he will tell us about troubled Hong Kong. During World War II he was a psychological warfare officer on General Stilwell's staff. He is the author of numerous books of fiction and nonfiction, including *Psychological Warfare*, published by the Infantry Journal Press, and is Professor of Asiatic Politics at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.

Indochina is a thorn bleeding vital strength from the democracies because of a failure in psychological strategy.

Major Paul M. A. Linebarger

Between Annam and the frontier of China proper there lay the rich Anamese province of Tonkin. West of Cochin China and Annam lay the decadent but beautiful kingdom of Cambodia, still inhabited by the Khmers, whose ancestors—in their one and only fit of political, esthetic, and artistic zeal—built the dream city of Angkor Wat between about 750 and 1250 A.D., only to let Angkor sink like a treasure ship beneath a sea of jungle. Finally, north of Cambodia, west of Annam and Tongking, running along the border of Siam, there was the high, wild, poor country of Laos.

Cochin China, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos—these were the five constituent countries of Indochina before the war.

Today there are three countries in Indochina:

Viet Nam, under French protection, is composed of the French-controlled parts of Cochin China, Annam, and Tonkin;

Cambodia, little changed except for a lone and uninterested sort of rebellion on the part of a few Cambodians who have set themselves up as Free Cambodians (*Khmer Issarak*), simply because everybody else in Asia has guerrilla movements and the Cambodians, languid though they may be, must have guerrilla movements too;

Laos, relatively quiet so far as the natives are concerned, but criss-crossed by exceedingly violent and dangerous Annamese.

These are the three governments of Indochina recognized by our State Department, recognized as existing by most of the UN facilities, and defended by a French army which includes a high proportion of *Wehrmacht* veterans who have enlisted in the French Foreign Legion.

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



A French armored-car crew covers a mine detector used to clear roads in an advance against the Viet Minh

But there is a fourth power, the one that is causing all the trouble—trouble characterized chiefly by superb infantry performance against the French and their lackadaisical local allies.


This fourth power is also called Viet Nam. It also covers prewar Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China. A communist movement with nationalist support, or a nationalist movement under Communist control—and nobody, not even the experts, can be sure which phrase is more descriptive—anti-French Viet Nam is usually referred to, not by the name of its government, but by the name of the political movement, which tries to destroy the Viet Nam set up by French power, recently reinforced by American aid, and tries to replace it with a pro-Stalin, pro-Mao, Viet Nam.

MARCH, 1951

That power is the Viet Minh. Look at the map and this pattern becomes plainer.

Much of the confusion over Indochina arises from the kind of mixup that might occur in the mind of an intelligent lama from Shangri-la who was told, by the first British visitor he had ever met, about England, Britain, Great Britain, the United Kingdom, the UK and the British Isles. He might think that they were six different countries somewhere near each other, or he might think they were all different names for England, which would not be true either. You can keep the picture straight if you remember that Viet Nam is the an-

A Viet Minh prisoner keeps his hands aloft as he is escorted back through the French lines



cient patriotic name which Annamese (who inhabit both Annam and Tonkin, as well as most of Cochinchina) have for their own realm. Therefore, the French use of the term "Viet Nam" represents a concession by the Paris authorities as to the label of the country; the French are trying to give their Viet Nam enough self-respect to make it an ally of France instead of a victim of Gallic imperialism. Cambodia and Laos remain relatively unaffected by what is in old-fashioned language a new Franco-Annamese war.

The other Viet Nam, which is being fought for by the Communist-dominated Viet Minh, represents a wartime leftover, in which emergent Asian nationalism has turned out to be a movement of men fighting, not for their right to be like Americans, but for their right to be like Russians.

No one now living can foretell how long the struggle in Indochina will go on. It has a patriotic base. The French did not complete the conquest of Annam until 1885 when the old empire of Annam-Tonkin passed from a light nominal and benign Chinese overlordship to a tight, real one, exploiting French control. In the fifty-five years of undisputed French control, the Annamese saw the French build more prisons than schools, more colonial palaces for French officials than universities for the natives.

Fifty-five years is not forever. The Annamese were restless under French rule, but the French gave them a sop to their pride by perpetuating the formal institutions of the ancient Annamese empire: Even after the Chinese empire fell in 1911-12, the ancient empire of Annam maintained the quaint imperial ceremonies which Annam had copied so faithfully from China a thousand and more years before. French rule was not atrocious, but neither was it a model of colonial practice.

When France itself fell in 1940, the local French authorities in Indochina stayed loyal to Vichy and did not join the Free France of General DeGaulle. These French colonial rulers were well rewarded—with a bitter and paradoxical kind of reward. They were allowed to be the stooges of the Imperial Japanese Army in the area, so that between 1940 and 1945 the peoples of East Asia saw a fantastic sight indeed. Proud French colonial officials served as the front men for a Japanese military regime, while having as their

front men the political relics of the ancient Annam empire. The common Annamese peasant thus saw himself governed by a nominal imperial Annamese mandarin, supervised by a French colonial officer, who was supervised in turn by an Imperial Japanese officer. Through the war years the common people of Annam and Tonkin had three empires on top of them—Annamese, French, and Japanese.

I myself was in Stilwell's G-2 office, which later became Wedemeyer's, between 1943 and 1945. Part of the story of Indochina is absurd, contradictory, and fantastic beyond all the dreams of a Milton Caniff or a George Wunder. Neither Terry and his pirates nor Steve Canyon ever faced adventures in the comic strips to compare with some of the escapades of our American and British contacts with the anti-Japanese forces in Indochina. We will have to wait a long time before enough American materials are declassified for the American public to know just how we supported the French against the Japanese, while supporting the Annamese against the French, while supporting the communists against the nationalists, while supporting the nationalists against the communists. If there was anybody in the entire area other than senior Japanese military personnel who did not get some kind of Allied aid to fight somebody else in the area of Indochina, I do not know who it could have been!

At the end of the war the Japanese were ready to leave, but the French weren't there. With V-J-day the last remnants of Vichy had disappeared and the Japanese in the Far East, with a superbly bold political warfare gesture, tossed out their French stooges and offered the Annamese any kind of independence which the Annamese might wish to set up for themselves.

(How many persons, even today, realize that Japan, just as the atomic bombs were falling at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, won some of the greatest political and psychological victories of modern times by giving Indonesia, Annam, and Korea their independence? Some Japanese staff officers did the modern world's finest single stroke of political warfare on that occasion, but I have never seen an article or document which said just who it was in the Japanese government or the Japanese military staff who recouped great Asian political victories out of

the bitter darkness of Japan's surrender.)

Japanese-granted independence under the nominal emperor, Bao Did, did not last long. By inter-Allied military agreement the Chinese and the British took over Indochina from the Japanese. (Could a situation be more complex than that? For a few weeks the Annamese peasant was under an Annamese official, technically under a French official, recently under a Japanese official, and currently under the British or Chinese army.) The British marched in, helped the French ashore, and marched back to their ships. The Chinese came in, stole everything that was portable, gave everything else to the bystanders, whether nationalists or communists, thumbed their noses at the French while letting the French in, and went back to China.

But what did the French find when they came in?

They discovered that the politics of 1940-1945 had unrolled with the breathless kaleidoscopic nonsense of an early Buster Keaton or Harold Lloyd comedy. Complexity had been compounded until it became chaos.

Out of chaos there stepped Ho Chi-minh. Ho Chi-minh was a tough, wiry, devoted little man. He is a hero and a great national leader, full of statesmanlike sagacity, if you like him. He is a tired, stupid, wornout nationalistic Communist, if you don't like him. On estimates of his character you can pay your money and take your choice.

There is no doubt as to his performance. Out of the last year of Japanese control, out of the confusion attendant upon Japanese dismissal of their docile Vichy stooges in 1945, out of help from world Communism and help from our own OSS, help from Chiang and Mao, both of them, an army had arisen. And a government had been proclaimed.

This was the Republic of Viet Nam.

The French tried to deal with these inexperienced and crude Asiatic bandits who were presuming to set up a nation of their own. French officers and officials had high confidence in their own capacity to outsmart the rude leaders of a peasant rabble. French political strategy was simple. France and Viet Nam agreed by the Hanoi Agreement of March 1946 to accept the Republic of Viet Nam as part of an Indochinese federation under the French empire (which took

on the more grandiloquent and democratic-sounding name of "The French Union"). Subsequent conferences between Viet Name and French were held at Dalat and Fontainebleau in 1946. But even while the two nationalities, Annamese and French, conferred with one another, they were fighting.

What were the realities?

On the Asian side there was a national movement of liberation in which the tough Annamese yearned for freedom so as to be able to resume their pre-French aggressions against Laos and Cambodia. Liberation did not mean lying down like lambs amid the lions in a political paradise. It meant the right to be themselves. And to be Viet Name or Annamese means being tough, turbulent, bright, and aggressive. The Annamese share with the Siamese the reputation of being the two fiercest nationalities of southeast Asia. Overlorded and goaded by French, Japanese, Chinese, British, and their own imperialism, they added communism to their struggle for liberation. The communism was not an insidious addition from Moscow. In the pre-1940 years most anti-French Annamese had turned to Moscow because the United States was not in the liberating business at that time and because Chiang's Kuomintang, though technically a revolutionary party, was willing to support little more than a sister-Kuomintang of Annam on paper. Only the communists were tough enough to double-cross everybody and start with grass-roots armies recruited from peasantry. Only the communists had the faith and the courage to face French bestiality or Japanese torture in rebelling during the war years.

On the European side a beaten and dishonored France had communists in its cabinet at home while it behaved like an old-fashioned empire overseas.

The reconciliations were a double double-cross. The French condescendingly negotiated with Ho; Ho contemptuously negotiated with the French. Each spied on the other. Each got ready for a fight.

The fight came. Since 1946 the Communist-led Viet Minh version of "Viet Nam" has been gained. The victories of Mao Tse-tung in neighboring China seemed world-shaking in adjacent Tonkin and Annam. The communist regime changed from being a hit-and-run movement of pure

guerrillas to a Yen-an-styled Communist insurrectionary republic, movable but not concealable, which governed all of the country part of the time and part of the country all of the time. When the Chinese Red Army reached the Indochinese frontier, endless reserves of ammunition, equipment, and training facilities were opened up. The Annamese or Viet Name are, roughly, sixteen million out of the twenty-three million people in Indochina, and most of them clung to the communist-led patriotic movement.

Indochina and Korea are the only two areas which can be reached effectively by Chinese Communist infantry power across the Yalu and Red Rivers, respectively.

What did Ho accomplish between 1946 and 1950?

He promoted his military movement two steps up in the communist scheme of things. Guerrilla bands had become a well equipped national army, all infantry. His technicians had begun to manufacture good local bazookas. His "Viet Nam" had been recognized by the USSR and had even been offered recognition by that heterodox communist prankster, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. The hinterland of Ho Chi-minh, once Mao came to power in China, reached back six thousand miles and more to the industrial complexes of Russia, while the French hinterland reached only to the coast and then had to be picked up by a long and expensive shipping route back to Europe.

On the French side there was the moth-eaten grandeur of Bao Dai, who (having been brought up a stooge) found it easy to keep on in the stooging business. But the French had thrown away with bad political warfare and bad psychological warfare everything that they gained with tough and efficacious infantry tactics. Paris stabbed Paris in the back—not by treason or conspiracy but by crudeness and unperceptiveness.

The French in Indochina did not trust Bao Dai enough to let him be a real national leader even if he could. The French military conquered villages and then alienated them. Throughout the French-held territory the communists operated a terroristic underground which tossed hand grenades, collected taxes, murdered "traitors," and mocked French power. If the French had succeeded, by the kind of genius which led the British to give up India in a tactful and

profitable way, or by the kind of toughness which the Japanese had used in massacring any bystander who so much as looked like "opposition," either in creating a despotic but safe colonial regime or in setting up genuinely pro-French Viet Name nationalists, they might have gotten one hundred per cent return from their military campaign against the rebels.

But from 1946 to the present the French threw away in the cities what they gained in the country. They did not trust any Annamese enough to let Annamese nationalism grow on the French side. Ho changed from being the leader of fugitive bands to becoming the leader of a chain of Communist peasant republics. In 1950 he began consolidating these very swiftly into a small, tough, strong Asiatic communist power. Behind him lay Communist China, and behind Communist China lay Communist Russia.

Therefore the war in Indochina is a bleeding war. A majority of the French regular troops, badly needed for the defense of Western Europe, are tied up in a fight against manpower—right at that one place on earth where manpower is cheapest of all. The Americans have done what they could to circumvent French crudeness and tactlessness by getting the French to allow direct U.S. diplomatic representation at the capitals of Viet Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Last summer the Far Eastern Military Aid Program Commission led by Major General Graves Erskine of the Marine Corps and Ambassador John Melby of the Department of State, surveyed the situation, and recommended aid. In 1950-51 American equipment began to pour in, but no American combat personnel.

Indochina and Korea are not comparable. Korea had a quiet military frontier between 1945 and 1950 when the Communist North Koreans broke loose. Indochina has not known peace yet. The Communists can't open aggression because they have been at it for years. Nothing they now did could be drastic enough to mark a "beginning."

Indochina has suffered strangely. The French are usually noted for their political suavity and tact, but here the French have lost with bad politics and worse propaganda what they have gained with good fighting. DeGaulist veterans and *Wehrmacht* veterans, fighting side by side against Annamese guerrillas across the paddy

fields, the jungles, or the forested hills of Indochina, have died in vain because nobody on the democratic side of the world knew how to take a patriotic movement away from its communist leadership.

Combat forces can do the job—when it's a combat job.

Combat forces can win tactical victories.

But tactics become strategy when victory makes sense. And the French have not been able to present, by politics or by propaganda, a victory that made sense to the common people of Viet Nam. American aid may help. Communism is bleeding France in Indochina and Communism will bleed us, too, if we go in with nothing more than weapons to offer.

War is a totality. If the Communists can bleed the French and us, we can bleed Mao and Stalin. But we cannot fight them with repeated tactical victories which are lost as soon as they are won. A democratic victory in Indochina can be a testing ground in which we learn the new kind of skills thrust upon us by the communist version of warfare.

Is it possible that World War III will never come? Is it possible that in its stead we have entered a historic period which no one of us has yet named—a period in which the old wars *between* nations are gone and the new wars *within* nations have come to stay? Are we not, perhaps, already in the middle of the First World Civil War? And if this is the First World Civil War, isn't Indochina a good place to take off the blinders of conventional thinking? Can we win if we keep on distinguishing between "political" and "military," keep on drawing lines between "American" and "French" and "Viet Nameese?"

We Americans are good at inventing things. If we turn our imaginations from the mechanical and the technical to the strategic, we can still give the communists the shock of their lives. But it will have to be by the sheer and awful *newness* of our strategy. I don't know the whys or hows. Nor perhaps do you. But I think that we as Americans are smart enough to think up *new* things. If we are half as good at that as we were on the military hardware job, we can give the communists in Indochina and elsewhere a real shock.

Perhaps the last shock of their political lives. . . .

CEREBRATIONS

The Leaders and the Led

Give Company A to a leader named Bradley; Company A will be well led. Give Company A to a leader named Patton; Company A will be well led. But Company A will notice a difference between the two leaders—different ways of doing things, different ways of handling the same problems. In short, it will be brought home to Company A that leadership is a personal thing.

Maybe that's what we mean when we say leadership is an art. No two artists ever painted the same scene alike, or even saw the same things in the same scene. And the lesson of this is that Lieutenant John Doe can never become a General Patton. He can learn from Patton, and Eisenhower and Bradley too, but he's got to know what to look for. The things to look for are not the exterior, particular things that seem to have made Patton Patton, but the universal, basic truths about men that make great leaders out of widely different personalities. Lieutenant Doe, then, has to look two directions at the same time: *back*, to see what were the bases of leadership, and *ahead*, to see how he will put into operation, *in his own way*, the principles he has discovered.

He must look closely at not only the leaders, but at the led. And he must remember that looking back too long will turn his head around—permanently.

The first issue of the COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL had an article, "Martinets or Mollycoddles," which looked wistfully to the time when we will strike the happy medium between the harsh leader and the soft leader. So we do. But the trouble is, there's an awful lot of ground between the two extremes. And it's possible to be very winning and very vague at the same time.

As an example of vagueness, I remember a book on leadership, widely read and followed, which told of one commander's way of handling chronic drunks. (The book said it was an effective way, *always* worked.) The method consisted of getting the man

Our literate cocktail-hour tacticians stand to receive as much as \$10.00 for their contributions to this department. However, the price for those "dashed off" with scant consideration for the rules of composition and rhetoric will be much less. Hold them to four or five hundred words and type them double-spaced.

in, looking him square in the eye and saying, "Jones, aren't you ashamed of yourself?"

I'm not making fun of that way of handling the problem. The point is that it may have worked for that leader and that man. But there are many leaders who would feel foolish saying, "Aren't you ashamed of yourself," and who would sound even funnier.

The author of "Martinets or Mollycoddles" says that the mollycoddler will get men needlessly killed. Well, so will the martinet. So will the leader who thinks his noncoms can get discipline only by beating up men out back of the boiler room. (Isn't that the method of the martinet?) What's the difference between slashing a man with a swagger stick and looking the other way while a platoon sergeant does the equivalent? Is that the happy medium we're after?

It's true that many leaders are confused by some of the things that have been advocated in the name of the "New Army." It's also true that some excellent new ideas have been subverted before they could percolate down to where they could work. Like the Troop Information Program.

I suspect that many leaders think that recruits are coming in who are very different from those thirty years ago. There's no question about it: they are different. But the Army still has to make fighting men out of them.

Recruits are different because society is different. Education isn't the same as it was thirty years ago; neither is art, politics, education or entertainment.

Leaders complain that men arrive in the Army without ideals or purpose, particularly ideals of patriotism. These same leaders blame the school, the church, the home. In other words, they blame society. They are right.

What leaders need to realize, however, is that the Army is what society says it will be. We are different from the Prussian Army because American society is different from Prussian society. The Army cannot change society; society will change the Army.

It's the same with education. People say the ills of our society will be cured with "education," forgetting that our society, ills and all, determines just what education will be—not the other way around.

The Army is a group within society; it is a social group. Men do not form themselves into any social group unless they see in it more desirable things.

All groups have standards which must be followed by all members if the group is to survive. Therefore there must be a common acceptance of standards. If a man refuses to follow the ritual of the Elks, the ceremonies of the Episcopalians or the regulations of the Army, he will soon find himself out of those groups.

The thing for a leader to do, then, is to seize upon the things that keep any group together and reinforce them constantly. An American leader starts out with many advantages in his favor. His men speak a common language; they have a common way of life; they share a common national past; they revere common symbols such as the flag; they have a common respect for the ideals of the Nation. It is tragic that some leaders, in spite of these real advantages which many other armies do *not* have, will sometimes fail. If they fail, it's because they do not emphasize these common grounds of understanding and do not supply them where they do not exist. A leader's job, his first job, is to keep his group together—as a team.

Anyone can see why the two worst things in a leader are favoritism and inapproachability. The worst thing about favoritism in a leader is that it destroys the unity we must have in an organization. It divides the unit itself into those who are "in with the Old Man," and those who are not. Inapproachability is divisive too; it divorces the leader from the organization. Nobody knows the Old Man and he doesn't know them.

The happy medium is easy enough to state; a leader must never compromise either on the mission or on the standards necessary to carry out the mission. Simple enough to state, but the carrying out of that rule is

the whole problem of leadership.

Individuals differ, both the leaders and the led. What one leader does will not work for another. Lieutenant Doe cannot become a leader by doing everything that Patton did. A Patton is not an Eisenhower or a Bradley; these men did not lead in exactly the same way. They did, however, agree on two things. They knew what their objectives were and they set up the necessary standards. And they never compromised on either.

That's what Lieutenant Doe has to do—think the thing out, and beware of articles on leadership, even this one. Leadership is a delicate job, impossible to put into a rule book. A tennis teacher can say, "Hold the racket this way." A leader speaking to leaders can only say, "These are the general directions that fit most situations. Abstract from them the particular principles you need. And then, write your own book."

But the thing Lieutenant Doe has to avoid is the too easy tendency to give up studying the new and peculiar conditions leaders have to face whether they like it or not. He must give up complaining about the recruits society has fashioned and sent to him, and begin to rediscover the principles of leadership. And above all, avoid forcing both himself and his men into molds that may no longer fit.

He should remember, finally, that young men, products of the Wailing and Gnashing of 1945-46, are now over in Korea, and will never come back. They did all right.

CAPT. A. KEVIN QUINN
USAR

What Gives the Staff the Jitters?

"Jittery staff officers" is a disparaging cliché. It purports to describe staff officers who exist in a constant state of dithers—and carries the further implication that it is a mystery how such incompetent fingernail-chewers were made staff officers in the first place.

Another connotation of the phrase suggests that they are a huddled group of psychoneurotic compounded anxiety complexes unable to handle nonstaff jobs, so have been given staff assignments as an act of charity.

But let's look at this matter more closely and with objective compassion, always remembering that staff officers are of great importance to every man in the Army, from senior commanders

down to the lowest ranking private.

No commander in his right mind would select jittery staff officers. Why, then, do so many staff officers show symptoms of strain and tension?

There are many reasons, but here are the primary ones:

Over a period of time a staff officer does far more work, under more and different kinds of pressure, than officers doing straight duty. There are exceptions, of course.

The staff officer must coordinate his work with many others—but does not always have the power to order coordination. Instead he has to secure cooperation, properly so. But it places a great strain on anyone to have the responsibility to get things done, without the authority to order them done.

There are so many details to be supervised by a staff officer that he can only afford to spend a minimum of time on any one of them. However, when a straight duty officer goes "up to headquarters" he normally has a pet project he wants approved, and picks a place in his own schedule so he will have plenty of time to "discuss" it indefinitely. The staff officer, with many other things pressing to be done, finally shows some impatience at being forced to waste his time until—eventually—the visitor leaves in a subdued huff to "spread the word the staff officer is "jittery." Impatience with wasted time thus has been translated into "jitters."

Sometimes commanders pick officers for a staff job who are not up to it, who simply do not have the mental capacity—and then ride hell out of them, just as a mule-driver can furiously whip a mule to make him pull a load beyond his capacity. The frantic efforts of the mule to pull the load beyond his strength are not unlike the equally frantic efforts of a staff officer who is being mercilessly driven to accomplish a job beyond his capacity. I suppose such a staff officer is jittery.

Still another situation that produces, eventually, symptoms of strain is one where an able and conscientious officer is given a job he is well equipped mentally and professionally to do but is refused the assistants and the means he needs to do the job. The result: A willing but overloaded horse will show signs of wear—and the jittery staff officer idea gets another boost.

Then there is the type of staff officer who always seems to be running

to the Old Man for even minor decisions. It is said he even asks permission to take . . . to blow his nose. Well, unless you have been in the position of that staff officer, it may be hard to understand—but it is almost certain his commander operates by the "rule of reversal." That is, if a staff officer makes any decision on his own, the commander will later make him change it if there is another way it can be done. After being reversed a few times, with all the confusion that causes, the staff officer resigns himself to the humiliating role of replying to almost any routine question, "If you will wait, I'll find out the answer."

Of course the Old Man is busy, and the visitor waits and waits. It's time-wasting and nerve-straining for everyone but the commander, who sits back, comforted by the knowledge he is letting everybody know every day that no staff officer can run his show. Of course the staff officer is classed as jittery, unable to decide anything, except the private decision that he will never serve on the staff of that commander again if he can avoid it.

Naturally, there are variations and additions to these reasons why staff officers sometimes appear jittery. Just as there are more than six ways to skin a cat, there are more than six ways to run staff officers nuts or jittery.

It all boils down to:

(1) *The Answer.* A commander who selects his staff well, gives them the tools to do their work, reasonable freedom of action within consistent policies, can demand and get their best efforts, without jitters.

(2) *The Danger.* A commander who picks fair-haired boys as staff officers, and lets them run the show without his personal check on their actions, may have a happy staff family—but he may also have an unhappy command.

(3) *The Moral.* For commanders: If members of your staff show signs of becoming jittery, examine your own judgment in selecting them, and examine your procedures in handling them.

For you: If a staff has a high percentage of jittery staff officers, don't spend too much time bestowing your pity and contempt on the poor things—but take a good look at that commander and never serve on his staff if you can help it.

LIEUTENANT LEARNING
Infantry

Rifle Squad Firing Exercises

Too often, rifle squad firing exercises are very unrealistic. The squad frequently fires from positions in close proximity and in a straight line. The targets are usually represented by clearly visible silhouette targets. As a result, the target designation element of the squad leader's order is not only a farce, but the members of the squad get the wrong idea of how an enemy unit would appear. Sometimes during an exercise the squad leader will expose himself or stroll around like an umpire at a maneuver.

To eliminate these errors, one National Guard unit at summer encampment tried to make its rifle squad firing exercise realistic and really instructive. All rifle squads attended a well prepared demonstration of 1,000-inch landscape firing. Emphasis was placed on proper fire distribution. Every man was told that he should fire on areas within his sector that an enemy would logically occupy. Squad leaders were instructed to make their fire orders complete without being too wordy. The use of tracers and observation of bullet strike were stressed.

The next, and final, phase was squad firing at field targets. The men were disposed in prepared standing-type foxholes covering an area that a squad would normally occupy. There was no straight line. The foxhole of the squad leader was dug to the rear of the riflemen and approximately in the center of the squad area. The assistant squad leader's hole was in the general vicinity of the automatic rifle team. Each man armed with the rifle was issued three clips of ammunition and the BAR gunner was issued three magazines. The squad leader and his assistant got an additional clip of tracer ammunition.

A number of area and point targets were previously prepared within the sector of the squad. Having a number of different areas prepared beforehand cut down the possibility of the squad leaders learning from their predecessors the locations they would be called upon to cover with fire. These targets were marked by issue type F (silhouette) targets. However, only one or two silhouettes were barely visible from the firing area. The greater parts of the targets were hidden behind bushes and vegetation where the enemy would be expected to seek concealment.

The exercise started with all men in position and the officer in charge privately designating the initial target area to the squad leader. Once the target was designated, battle noise records were played from a nearby PA system. From there on, the conduct of the exercise was up to the squad leader. If he decided to leave his hole, he had to crawl. After the squad opened fire on the initial target, a surprise target was designated, again privately, to the squad leader. He then had to decide and execute his plans to shift the fires of his squad. Following the end of the firing, the squad was taken through the target areas to see for themselves the hidden targets and the effects of their fires. Each exercise was concluded with a critique.

The value of this type of exercise can be expressed by the comments of the men who participated. Many squad leaders said that this was the first time they had a clear conception of the difficulty of controlling the eight men of their squad under approximate combat conditions. They saw that their squads must develop an SOP to insure that orders within the squad are quickly transmitted. The riflemen said that they now appreciated why a foxhole had to have a comfortable firing position. Above everything else, every man, noncom and private, was impressed with the need for properly distributing fire and the futility of not firing at visible targets.

MAJOR IRVING HEYMONT
Infantry-NGUS

Lead With Their Right —and Learn

There is a lot of talk in the Army about the importance of delegating authority. There is a lot more talk than practice, and that is unfortunate because the consequences of failure to delegate authority are many, and they are all bad.

I am not going into any high-flown discussions of span of control. And although it is clear that the exact solution of a given problem requires a more complete knowledge of the problem's details and ramifications than the officer one or two echelons removed can be expected to have, I will not labor the point. What I speak of here is the effect on the officer or NCO, especially when he is young and inexperienced, who is told in detail precisely how he will

go about attaining a given result.

I remember a case a few years ago when a young battery commander got a communication from the headquarters of the training center where he was stationed. It ran something like this: "Private Soandso of your organization was found drunk and disgusting on some civilian's doorstep in the neighboring town last evening. You will award punishment, under AW 104, of not less than three days' extra duty or not more than four days' restriction. You will reply by indorsement hereon as to action taken."

In honest puzzlement I ask: who was commanding that battery? Was it the battery commander? Since he had no discretion in the discipline of his men, he was hardly exercising command. What will such a system do for the battery commander's initiative? In the field, he will not find a headquarters to give him an answer every time he runs into something not covered in his SOP. If he has been conditioned in training to expect the minutest decisions to be made for him, he will be unable to solve problems for himself, or he will be afraid of getting into trouble for trying to do so. In short, he is given no opportunity to learn how to handle his job; worse, he is actually discouraged from trying to adapt to his own personality and conception of practical command the perfectly sound but inevitably abstract principles which he has been taught as a cadet or an officer candidate.

The situation described here was probably not universal, but it certainly was and still is widespread. It stems from the fact that officers of several years' service, forgetting that they once had to learn too, lack confidence in the ability of their subordinates. It is quite possible that the green company commander—or squad leader, for that matter—will make mistakes, many of which would be obvious to the man who has passed from that level to the greater glories of the staff or to the eminence of battalion or regimental command. If he dictates in detail the course to be followed by his subordinates there will undoubtedly be fewer mistakes—in training. In the short run this method will probably get better results, but in the long run it does a great deal of harm.

Initiative is the greatest innate quality of the American soldier. It is a quality which must be fostered and encouraged. But if it is to exist

at all it must be given breathing space, not suffocated by an oppressive blanket of detailed instructions.

Furthermore, effectiveness in any job is built on a man's confidence in his own ability to do that job. He can gain this confidence only by experience in coping, on his own, with the complexities of his duties.

Now, far be it from me to suggest that an experienced officer should withhold from his juniors the benefit of his knowledge and experience. But it does not follow that he should specify every detail of the solution which he recommends that his juniors apply to a problem.

The formula is simple enough: say *what* is to be done, *when* and *where* (if they apply), *why* (if time and circumstances permit), plus any information that may make the working-out of a solution easier. But as for the *how*—leave that to the man who has to do the job. He may lead with his right, but if he has any sense at all, you may be sure that before he has got all the blood wiped off his shirt-front he has made up his mind not to do that again.

MAJOR JOHN B. B. TRUSSELL
Artillery

Protect the Combat Infantryman Badge

To those who know what endless days in the front lines really mean, the Combat Infantryman Badge stands as both a symbol of and a tribute to the fighting heart of our Army—the combat infantryman.

Unfortunately, however, there are a few who wear this proud badge but who have not really earned it. Some of my readers may say sour grapes. They will be partly correct, for I admit I would gladly trade all my decorations (SS, LM, BSM, AM, and CR) for the Combat Infantryman Badge.

But who are the ones who wear the Badge without having earned it? I am not speaking of the regimental adjutants, regimental personnel officers, service company personnel and other members of an infantry regiment whose duties are not entirely of a combat nature. Under the regulations prescribing the award, such men can properly be awarded the Badge. I do refer to those who have been awarded it wrongly. A small number are general officers. I don't mean those who got their stars the hard way, by successfully commanding regiments in combat, but some who

went overseas as division or even corps commanders, or who were promoted to brigadier general in a staff job and were then assigned as assistant division commanders. Obviously they are not entitled to the award, because how could a general officer properly be assigned to an infantry regiment?

I do not intend to single out general officers. Most of those I have reference to are field-grade officers—several division chiefs of staff and other staff officers, who never served a day of combat with an infantry regiment, yet nonetheless wear the Badge. Another served in the G-2 section of a theater headquarters. He was awarded the Badge for visiting regimental CPs, hardly justification for such an award. Another was a G-4 in a base section who once visited an infantry division CP for three whole days.

Beyond this, there is the question of current eligibility requirements. There are many who feel that they are too liberal, and I agree. Serious consideration should be given to limiting the award to those infantrymen who fight forward of the battalion CP. There lie the real front-line fighters as borne out by World War II casualty records which show that 93% of all division casualties occurred forward of infantry battalion command posts.

There remains the question of what can be done about it. One solution would be to do what was done with the Medal of Honor. As a result of injudicial awards before World War I (in one case all members of an entire regiment were awarded the Medal of Honor for volunteering to extend their enlistment period during the Civil War), a War Department board of officers was appointed in 1916 to examine all records. The Secretary of War, acting upon the recommendation of this board, revoked all awards which did not meet the standard of "gallantry above and beyond the call of duty." Thus has the high standard of the Medal of Honor been maintained. To take such action in the case of the Combat Infantryman Badge would be administratively impractical, if not impossible. It would appear then that the solution lies with the conscience of the individual. Let each who wears the Badge search his soul and say, "Have I honestly earned this proud symbol?"

LT. COL. HARDTACK
Infantry

NEWS OF THE SERVICES

INFANTRY

Commandant

Changes in the top command of The Infantry School are, of course, nothing new. It happens at Benning just as elsewhere in the Army. But the transfer of General Burress to command of VI Corps and the appearance of the new Commandant, Major General Church, is of unusual interest. Partly it reflects the growing strength of the combat army in training (corps commands have been a rarity in the past few years), but mostly the interest is in obtaining a Commandant fresh from the war in Korea. Officers of other ranks with combat experience in Korea are also appearing for duty at the School and with General Church leading the way it can be expected that the vital lessons of Korea will not be disregarded.

Infantry OCS

The first class of the reestablished Infantry Officer Candidate School got started at Fort Benning on 18 February. Twelve classes a year are planned. The size of the first class had not been determined at the time this was written.

It is of interest to note that during World War II and after the Benning OCS turned out 67,190 second lieutenants. The Infantry OCS was first established in July 1941 and the last class graduated in November 1947. The big years were, of course, 1942-44.

Students & Courses

Almost 1,400 students began courses in January that will help make them combat leaders and transportation, communication, airborne or intelligence and reconnaissance experts.

Most of the students—the figure is 935—are enrolled in these courses: Associate Infantry Officers Advanced Course, Associate Infantry Company Officers Course, Parachute Rigging and Repair Course and Basic Airborne Course. Some fifty students are enrolled in the Motor Transportation Course. Incidentally, the Parachute Rigging Course has been lengthened by a couple of days to give additional instruction in heavy-drop techniques.

Many more foreign students are appearing on the Benning "campus." This is a direct influence of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact (MDAP). A scheduled Associate company officers course is expected to have some 60 MDAP officers enrolled.

Infantry T/O&Es

It is interesting to note that The Infantry School has found that the new T/O&Es are much more readable than the old ones. Changes are being made constantly in the infantry tables to include the new MOS numbers and job titles of enlisted personnel under the career guidance program. In this connection it is worth noting that two Special Regulations have been published on the enlisted career program.

SR 615-25-15 (*Enlisted Personnel: Military Occupational Specialties*) contains the authorized enlisted MOS and codes for each job in all the career fields. The job descriptions contained in this new SR represent a complete reevaluation of the enlisted military occupational structure of the Army based on information obtained during and after World War II.

SR 615-25-20 (*Enlisted Personnel: Career Fields*) introduces all the authorized career fields. Thirty-one career fields are now in effect. This SR establishes the career field job progression ladders. In addition, it prescribes procedural methods for all 31 career fields. For the first time commanders in the field have one document in which is contained appropriate information concerning all career fields.

ARTILLERY

OCS Reestablished

For the first time since the close of World War II, an officer candidate school for Artillerymen is in operation. The school began at Sill on 21 February. Current planning calls for 115 candidates to be enrolled in each class. The course is 22 weeks in length and a new class will be started every four weeks. This means that approximately 575 officer candidates will be undergoing training simultaneously. Graduates will go directly to

artillery assignments without having to attend any further basic courses.

'Copter Pilot Training

Nineteen selected members of the Department of Air Training staff and faculty became the first group of helicopter pilots to receive their basic flight training at The Artillery School. Previously the basic flight training had been conducted by the Air Force at two Texas bases.

The coming organization of helicopter transportation companies means that there will be a large increase in the need for instructors in tactical flight training in 'copters. The nineteen basic graduates from the present faculty will be fully qualified to handle this instruction. The peak load is expected to begin in March.

Tactical flight training will be conducted in two phases. Phase One consists of transition flying in the H-13B and H-13C helicopters for those basically trained on the YR-13. A review of fundamentals and autorotations (dead-stick landings to ground-pounders) are also a part of Phase One training.

Phase Two calls for cross-country flights, day and night tactical exercises, operations from confined areas, and the adjustment of artillery fire.

Job Title Changes

Recent T/O&E changes reflect the same old faces but with some new names. The old Message Center Chief will now be known as the Senior Signal Message Clerk, and his assistant is titled just plain Signal Message Clerk.

In the wire section, the Wire Sergeant is now the Wire Section Chief; the head of the wire crew is now called the Wire Team Chief. Other new titles in the wire field include: Senior Switchboard Operator, Senior Wireman, and Wireman Helper.

Similar changes are reflected in the radio sections. The old Radio Sergeant becomes the Radio Section Chief; Radio Repairmen have become Radio Mechanics, with the top man adding the word "Senior" to his title. Radio Operators are now labeled Intermediate-Speed Operators or Low-Speed Operators, depending on the degree of skill attained.

Command Nets

To eliminate the confusion which has been present in the designation

of artillery "command" and "control" radio nets. The Artillery School has decided to call both of them "command nets," differentiated by the inclusion of "FM" or "AM," as appropriate.

The radio net employing frequency modulated radio sets, previously designated "control net," short title K, is redesignated "command net (FM)," short title K.

The net employing amplitude modulated radio sets, previously designated "command net," short title W, is redesignated "command net (AM)," short title W.

This change in policy does not affect the designation of radio nets in armored artillery units.

Rapid Reading Lab

The Artillery School's Reading Laboratory was made available to this year's Advanced Officers' Course on a voluntary basis. Of the 399 officers in the class, 316 volunteered for the training, which is designed to improve reading ability. Due to the heavy schedule which the class faced this year, most of the reading training had to be taken during noon-hour periods and after regular class hours. The officers participating made an average gain of 38 per cent in speed and 7 per cent in comprehension.

Correction!

Some time ago we announced in these columns that new survey computation forms were available through DA AGO Publications, Washington, D.C. They are not yet available. We'll let you know when they are.

Unit commanders who wish to have their officers and key enlisted men take advantage of artillery Extension Courses should have them enroll in the regular manner. If necessary, the commander can schedule the submission of lessons by the students.

Big-Time Operation

During 1950 the Extension Courses Branch of the Division of Training Publications, The Artillery School, graded nearly 100,000 lessons and examinations. This represents an increase of 30,000 lessons over 1949, and 65,000 lessons over 1948.

Even though many officers have been recalled to active duty as the result of the Korean war, student activity continues to increase.

During 1950 the total enrollment fell from approximately 10,000 to about 8,300. A stricter policy on cancellation for failure to meet minimum requirements weeded out all inactive students.

Officials of the Extension Courses Branch have had to regretfully deny requests from the field for large numbers of copies of AEC materials for use in unit troop training programs. Regulations forbid the use of Extension Courses materials for this type of training.

Master Lesson Plans

Master lesson plans are being prepared by the Survey Section of the Department of Observation, TAS, which cover general subject matter of survey methods now being taught in the Specialist Survey Courses. They also will serve as ready references for all artillery survey personnel.

These master plans outline in detail such phases of survey as traverse, triangulation, resection, astronomic observations for azimuth determination, transit repair, and review of mathematics. It is contemplated that they will be available through the Book Department, TAS, about April 1951.

Extension Courses

The infantry-artillery team is the subject of the latest extension subcourse published by TAS. Subcourse 40-8 (*Infantry Tactics, The Regiment*), issued 1 January 1951, covers the organization and tactics of the infantry regiment from the artilleryman's viewpoint. It teaches the technique of command liaison and also deals with joint fire planning by infantry and artillery officers.

Also issued early in January was subcourse 30-16AAA (*Fire Control, AA Guns*). This subcourse covers the operation of AAA directors and cabling systems, and the organization and synchronization of the AAA battery.

The new antiaircraft extension subcourse 20-11AAA (*AAA Matériel, Guns*) has been approved by AFF. This course covers the characteristics, description, and functioning of AAA guns, mounts, and power plants. It consists of five lessons and an examination. Publication date is tentatively set for 1 April 1951.

The revised edition of extension subcourse 30-13FA (*Unobserved Fire*)

went into circulation 1 February 1951. This subcourse has been revised to incorporate the target grid procedure and all recent minor changes. It is a part of the special field artillery gunnery series.

Resident Schooling

Ninety-one Reserve officers have graduated from the special thirty-day ORC refresher course in Army aviation tactics since the first course was offered early in November 1950. The course is designed for Reserve officers who have recently been recalled to active duty.

It is contemplated that the courses will be repeated every month until all of the newly recalled officers have had an opportunity to be "refreshed."

The average student has been out of the Army about five years and has done very little flying during that time. This requires the course to be about evenly divided between ground school and tactical flying.

Most of the flying is being done in the new 125-hp Piper Cub, which has not yet been given an "L" designation. The manufacturer calls it the PA-18. With almost double the horsepower of the old familiar 65-hp L-4 of World War II, most aviators are enthusiastic about its take-off and climb characteristics.

Fifty-one ORC artillery officers attended weekend courses of instruction at the Department of Matériel, TAS, in December and January. The courses are designed to teach potential instructors of artillery matériel the latest methods and techniques.

These brief sessions are the first two of a series of three which those officers will attend at Fort Sill. They will receive a total of forty-four hours training by the close of the third session, which will be held in February.

It is planned that many more ORC artillery officers will get an opportunity to attend similar courses at TAS in the near future.

More than 175 field officers of newly activated National Guard units completed artillery refresher courses at TAS. Four courses were conducted, each of one week's duration. It is anticipated that as other National Guard units are called to active duty, the program will be continued.

Other Non-Resident Courses

The Department of General Subjects, TAS, isn't confining its instruction in MOI (Methods of Instruction) to resident students. Neither is

it requiring non-resident students to do correspondence work. It is dispensing its instruction by flying instructors of the MOI section to various localities in the Southwest for on-the-spot teaching.

Reserve officers who are prospective instructors of artillery subjects are being given special instruction in technical subjects at their home stations in order to insure that sufficient instructors will be adequately trained if and when they are needed.

The Department of Combined Arms, TAS, has arranged a six-months course of instruction for prospective ORC instructors in the combined arms field.

The training will be done from a POI prepared at the school and sent to the home stations of the reservists. In addition, instructors from the regular TAS staff and faculty will travel to those stations at least three times during the six-months period in order to coordinate the instruction.

its position. When this work is completed, the team is ready. Now it has the jump on the tank. When the enemy vehicle appears, the gunner can begin tracking. He has no worries about the range or loading. He is ready for the kill. [When] the center opening of the sight reticle is . . . on the point that he has selected for the best shot . . . he squeezes the trigger and the rocket is on its deadly way . . ."


Captain Robert M. Cook of the Infantry School's automobiles department describes the Army's new two and one-half ton truck. Built by Reo this truck will be officially described as "Truck, 2½-ton, 6x6, Cargo, M-34." It has synchromesh transmission and transfer case, automatically engaged and disengaged front wheel drive, hydraulic brakes with compressed air booster and a 24-volt electrical system.

It was designed and built for military use and is not a civilian vehicle applied to military uses. This provides a number of advantages. The load capacity is 10,000 pounds on highways and half that much across country. Its cargo space is 147 inches by 80 inches by 60 inches. It has a top speed of sixty miles an hour and will climb a constant 3.8 per cent grade with full load at thirty miles an hour. It has a range of 350 miles at thirty-five miles per hour and fuel capacity of fifty gallons. It's gasoline mileage is seven miles per gallon. It has several attractive airborne features. New 11x20 cross-country tires give it greater flotation than the tires used on the old GMC 2½-tonner.

Why not increase the value of the SCR-300 radio by installing it in the L-5 aircraft and using it as an air-ground liaison set, asks Lieutenant Chester R. Mead. It's not a new idea, he says, and has been used before in an improvised fashion but he proposes and describes a method of installing it on a more permanent basis. If we do this, he writes, we will have greater flexibility of communication.

Russian Jets

Two British writers, William Greene, an aviation authority, and Roy Cross describe the new Soviet jet planes in the January-February issue of *Ordnance*. Many of them are pictured in photographs. The authors say that Soviet aeronautical engineers have designed planes, that "should give an appreciable advantage in close combat at high altitudes and their



Korean Report

In the January-February *Anti-aircraft Journal* Major General William F. Marquat writes an extensive account of a swing around Korea to visit every AAA outfit he could find. This was his second tour of such units in Korea and his summary of the visit is good reading:

"During the first visit there were many youngsters in the units who were enthusiastically awaiting their first contact with the enemy—this time these same young men reappeared as seasoned veterans, matured by the realization of the combat action they had sought. Infantry, artillery and special troops all displayed a supreme confidence in their cause, their leaders, their weapons and their ability to win. The only complaints I heard were directed at the necessity for their withdrawal which, of course, was necessary to permit the regrouping and reemployment of the forces.

"An army composed of men like these may be overrun temporarily by vastly superior numbers but it can never be defeated."

Weapons and Equipment

Weapons and equipment get a big play in the January issue of the *Infantry School Quarterly*. There's an article on the big bazooka, the new two and one-half ton truck, use of the SCR-300 in airplanes, and the use of field glasses.

The author of the piece on the 3.5-inch bazooka is Captain Robert J. Parr who headed the first instruction team rushed to Korea with the weap-

on. What many of you unfamiliar with the weapon may not know is that it is actually lighter than the 2.36-inch bazooka used in World War II. Its weight is about fifteen pounds. Captain Parr says it is not an unwieldy weapon to carry. It comes in two pieces and a sling arrangement that holds the two pieces side by side is provided. When assembled the weapon is a quarter of an inch more than five feet in length. The front barrel has a folding bipod and an adjustable monopod has been made an integral part of the shoulder stock on the rear barrel. The combination forms a tripod.

There are tricks to firing the big bazooka that need not be described here. But Captain Parr does give some facts that may be of general interest. There are two types of ammunition: an HE, AT rocket and a practice rocket. Each weighs about eight and one-half pounds. It has a muzzle velocity of 340 feet per second, and a maximum range of 900 yards. However, a man stalking a moving tank should get within 200 yards before letting fly.

Its tactical uses are worth repeating. "Upon being given an area to defend," Captain Parr writes, "the team locates the most likely tank approach and selects a position where it can best deliver effective rocket fire against tanks moving along this approach. Before preparing the position, the gunner locates a point along the approach where he can get the best shot . . . [he] estimates the range to this point and sets that range on the elevation scale . . . Now, the team can prepare

superior maneuverability should be especially beneficial when delivering the *coup de grace* to an enemy bomber." They may not have the speed or steadiness of British and American jets but "two successive wars have proved that superior maneuverability is frequently of greater value than superior speed." The authors conclude that the new Soviet jets "illustrate lucidly the gap-bridging process that has been carried out in the Soviet Union during the last few years in making up the leeway in technical progress so long held by Britain and the U.S.A. The Soviet Air Force, already superior to the combined air arms of the Atlantic Pact signatories in quantity, is now approaching parity in the qualitative sense."

Flyer's Gripe

All is well in Marine Corps aviation. They're belly-aching, which is the best of all possible signs among Marines as well as soldiers. The griper in this case is Captain Lynn W. Griffiths, a Marine pilot, in the February **Marine Corps Gazette**. It's all very well that "in the Corps . . . a pilot is a Marine officer first, then an aviator," Captain Griffiths writes, but "it is interpreted to mean a Marine ground officer first then an aviator" and that isn't good. Even the flying proficiency of a Marine pilot has less to do with his efficiency reports and his eventual promotion than his ability to perform ground duties, Captain Griffiths says. This plus the extra assignments piled on a pilot mean that his "main attention is focussed on non-flying duties." Captain Griffiths doesn't think this a desirable situation and may result in a lowering of the combat efficiency of pilots. Even at Quantico attending school he spends more time learning to lead a company or battalion than he does in flying. And the opportunities for attending an Air Force tactical school are limited. To rid Marine aviators of this pain in the tummy Captain Griffiths recommends a new course for aviators at the Marine Corps Schools and revision of aviation tables of organization so that pilots will have more time for flying and flight training. "Until changes are made in the training and employment of Marine aviators, the Marine Corps may have a good air arm simply because they are Marines, but it will not be as good as the proper emphasis on flying could make it," Captain Griffiths concludes.

MARCH, 1951

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SURVEY

World Perimeters

Colonel Conrad H. Lanza

ASIA

THERE is general delight in Asia that the white races after having bossed them for so long and in some cases mistreated them, are now getting their comeuppance. All Asia sympathizes with China and is opposed to any punitive action against the Mao regime. To argue that China is an aggressor is immaterial. The Asians want to drive the Americans and Europeans out of Asia. That is the real issue. China is making the attempt; Indochina and Malaya are trying too. The rest of Asia wishes them success.

Europe. There is a prevailing fear that the United States may become embroiled in a major war in the Far East. This would alienate all of Asia, encourage North Africa to revolt, result in loss of oil, rubber, tin and other resources essential to West Europe's economy, and lead to endless complications. With an Asia War occupying our attention Europe would not receive the financial and military aid from the United States that it must have. Without that aid Europe cannot hope to repel Russia's drive to the Atlantic and/or the Middle East. For these reasons and others Western Europe, including our North Atlantic allies, is reluctant to support the United States' diplomatic moves against Red China.

USSR AND CHINA

ON 14 January Peiping dispatches reported that Red China was willing to discuss a proposal from the United Nations for cease-fire in Korea. On the 16th the Russian press published Moscow's disapproval of that idea, and on the following day China declined the proposal, unless the following conditions were fulfilled:

- (1) Withdrawal of all foreign

troops from Korea (Chinese are *volunteers*, not foreign troops);

- (2) Withdrawal of US forces from Formosa and Formosa Strait;

- (3) Admittance of Communist China to the United Nations;

- (4) The US to submit to a peace conference to be convened in China, whose members would be the United States, Great Britain, France, China, India, Egypt and the USSR (latter four are Communist, or friendly to Communist China).

These terms are the same as suggested by the USSR, when the United States at the opening of the Korean war requested the friendly offices of Moscow to arrest the North Korean invasion. This episode illustrates the close liaison between Moscow and Peiping.

It must therefore be presumed that the USSR is satisfied with the current situation in the Far East, and does not desire an armistice or peace.

Soviet movements. According to Kuomintang China G-2 reports, strong Soviet reinforcements are moving to the Far East. At least ten divisions, plus other troops, are involved. Part of this force is proceeding by sea through the Arctic to northeast Siberia. It now appears that the USSR has succeeded in maintaining an open all-year passage north of Siberia. One of the new divisions is reported as having taken station at Kalgan (northwest of Peiping). In return for this movement Communist China has sent ten divisions to Inner Mongolia, which is Soviet controlled, for training and equipment. These ten Chinese division may eventually appear in Europe.

Russians are reopening the naval base at Tsingtao. Presence of numerous Soviet technicians in Kwantung point to a possibility of some kind of base being opened in that area. Strong Chinese reinforcements, including at least six divisions, have arrived in

Kwantung. General Lin Piao was recognized in January near Canton, and appears to be in command. This general was last reported as in command of the 4th Army Group, supposed to be in Korea. However, the army group headquarters and General Lin Piao himself, never have been identified as being in Korea. The Chinese reinforcements in the south do not necessarily point to an invasion of Indochina, which is the common explanation. Some divisions are just back of the coast and north of Hong Kong, apparently in readiness to repel a Kuomintang invasion from Formosa should the United Nations decide to authorize it. The people of Kwantung did not like the Kuomintang, but now they like the Communists less, and they might give aid to an invasion.

West Europe. If the Soviet is, as it seems, satisfied with the situation in the Far East, she is dissatisfied with the situation in Europe. She fears that West Germany will be rearmed and join the North Atlantic alliance. Should that happen, the North Atlantic allies would be superior in strength and resources to the USSR and her satellites, and Communist expansion might be set in reverse.

In a note delivered on 20 January, the USSR forcibly disapproved of the conversations going on with West Germany relating to its rearming. The tone of the note was threatening, accused the Allies of violating treaties (nothing said about Soviet violations of same treaties). Taken in connection with earlier notes commencing with that from Prague on 22 October last, the inference is that Russia will fight if her demands are not conceded. On 6 January the Soviet press had published editorials to the effect that the question of Germany must be settled if there is to be peace. It was claimed necessary to mobilize all forces of peace-loving democracies (meaning the USSR and her satellites) to resist the war threats of the United States and her allies. This was the first time the Soviet people were directed to prepare for war in the immediate future.

Some European statesmen are of the opinion that the Soviet is not prepared for war during 1951. To avoid that, they believe, the USSR will make substantial concessions if Germany is kept permanently disarmed, and that it is therefore worth while to attempt some bargaining. With that idea in mind the United States, Great Brit-

ain and France have jointly proposed a conference of Foreign Ministers of the Big Four to discuss the German question, and all other matters in dispute between the USSR and the West. If Russia accepts an opportunity to bargain Germany's status against Soviet concessions elsewhere—Korea, Austria, Trieste, and so on—will be presented. If the Soviet declines a new and dangerous situation will arise.

New Soviet forces have appeared near the west end of Lake Balaton in Hungary. These have been assumed to be a threat against Yugoslavia. This is doubtful. In the past four hundred years attacks against Yugoslavia have normally been east of Lake Balaton because of the better terrain there. No attack launched from the west side has succeeded. While with new roads now available, past experiences are not decisive, the roadnet points to an invasion through Styria either into north Italy or south Germany.

WEST GERMANY

ON 23 December 1950 US High Commissioner McCloy spent three hours seeking to convince the leader of the German opposition to agree to rearming Germany. He had no great success. Next day Chancellor Adenauer expressed the opinion that the honor of the German soldier and army must first be restored before agreement on rearming. It made no sense to have publicly condemned Germany's military leaders to death and others to confinement for waging aggressive war against the USSR, while Germany is now being asked to prepare to do just that. It was suggested that Admiral Doenitz, Field Marshals Mannstein and Kesselring, Lieutenant General Falkenhausen, and others now in confinement be released and restored to duty.

This point has been partly conceded by General Eisenhower, who has publicly stated that the honor of the German army has never been involved, only that of certain individuals, and that so far as he is concerned as the Supreme Commander for the North Atlantic allies, he respects the German officer and soldier.

Conferences between East and West Germans have been futile. The West German government has declined to negotiate unless East Germany first accepts law and liberty as understood in civilized nations. There is a possi-

bility that the USSR will accept this condition and agree to East and West Germany voting proportionately to their respective populations provided the West agrees to permanent disarming of Germany and withdraws all occupation troops. Should this be accepted, the Soviet with its powerful military forces at the German border could seize that country at any time it pleases. This danger is recognized by Germany as well as by the Western Powers.

NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

ON 7 January General Dwight D. Eisenhower arrived in Paris, to assume command as Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic allies in Europe. He immediately began his well-reported visit to the capitals of each of the allies to acquaint himself with the high commands with whom he will have to operate, and to ascertain what each ally can, or proposes to do.

On 19 December Italy offered to raise twelve modern divisions and reestablish its armament industry, provided the United States would aid to an extent not specified. Negotiations as to the aid needed began at Rome on 9 January. The peace treaty with Italy limits the size of its army. The treaty would have to be amended, or disregarded, if a modern Italian army is to be raised.

There is hesitation in Europe on rearming. The fear is that it is useless to do much, because the USSR will never permit it, and will attack. Others think there will be time because the Soviet is as unprepared for war in the immediate future as the North Atlantic allies are.

West Germany sticks to the view that the North Atlantic allies should assemble their present and future forces well in rear of the Soviet frontier to avoid any possibility of their being overwhelmed by Soviet forces, which are superior at present but might not be at some future date if West Europe accomplishes its rearmament. This is the sound strategic point of view, which is accepted by some of the North Atlantic allies. Unofficial reports are that Spain is willing to have the Allies concentrate in her territory in rear of the Pyrenees and at the same time make an immediate contribution of twenty divisions to the common cause. These divisions do not have modern equipment.

BOOK REVIEWS

Men In Barracks — 1941

FROM HERE TO ETERNITY. By James Jones. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. 861 Pages: \$4.50.

You will hear a lot about this book. It could quite conceivably be barred from the mails or banned in Boston or elsewhere for its obscene words. It stands a chance both of praise and damnation by the literary critics. It shows prewar Army life in a way that could make fond parents shudder at their sons' having to enter such a life. And since all the officers pictured in it are either stinkers or complacent incompetents, you can figure on possible sharp criticism from military readers.

Yet in my opinion the book is a remarkable achievement despite its many faults, which I will discuss a little later on. It has power and drive. It pictures many aspects of prewar peacetime Army existence far more accurately than any writer has ever done. And it captures the speech of the soldier of that era with equal accuracy—profanity, obscenity and all. It is a solid concrete chunk of story, even if it does crack and crumble a little at certain junctures. You will hear a lot about it, and probably for a long time.

Then what is wrong with it? First, it is longer by a great deal than it needed to be. It goes back to the same old scenes and the same old talk—in the orderly room, the barracks, the mess hall, the local cat house, the several bedrooms where the first sergeant carries on his affair with the captain's wife—you get tired of them all, no matter what's happening.

Next, despite the faithful reproduction of barracks talk—the four-letter words, incidentally, are not overstressed; they fall naturally into the speech—there is one unforgivable omission—lack of humor. The give-and-take, the wisecracks and all are there, except the sense of the fact of laughter. In life, the free speech of both officers and enlisted men is never long without humor, but this writer seldom captures it.

For another thing—and many readers will consider this the gravest fault—the entire attention of the reader is focussed on perhaps a dozen men in a company of a hundred or more. It is an infantry company at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, during the year 1941 carrying on through Pearl Harbor. It is a company of athletes, particularly of boxing champions. But behind the dozen characters or so we con-

stantly see, the other ninety or more are almost non-existent. The punch-drunk screwballs we do see that (except the first sergeant and the new mess sergeant, who are able soldiers) get the novelist's whole attention. It is a serious distortion not to show the whole outfit more clearly.

Once I served at a post in the tropics as a lieutenant in a company of athletes, chiefly boxers. Before then I had been a private and corporal, cadet and lieutenant in eight different companies, two of which I had commanded for brief periods. This company of athletes bore small resemblance to the Company G in *From Here to Eternity*. It wasn't a good company by any means, and for two reasons. Most of the men including the noncoms were allowed to put so much of their time and energy into athletics that they didn't have much left for military training. It was a sluggish, listless sort of outfit. The other reason was that most of the noncoms (they were the best boxers in general of longest boxing experience) were on the punch-drunk side. They didn't seem to have clear enough minds left to learn at all well the technicalities of their military jobs, those of a machine-gun outfit in an infantry regiment.

As for the off-duty pursuits, sexual and otherwise, of my particular company of "fighters" there were no indications that they were much different from those in any other outfit. In most infantry companies, then, and I dare say now, half or more of the men were far from loose in their pastimes. Some had girls back home, and some were not especially inclined toward raising hell, even on payday. But even with the rest heavy drunkenness was no great problem in that company. With one or two occasional exceptions, the company showed up for duty, Monday and other mornings, able to function. Several of the noncoms were, of course, married, and their wives were big ring-side fans. Some few of the company undoubtedly had steady women companions in the nearby cities without benefit of clergy.

So I must say flatly that the Company G of the book is not recognizably similar to the outfit I've just described. I recall only one reference in it to a married noncom, and there is hardly the vaguest glimmer of the bulk of the company, which must have been in there pitching at regular duty in some reasonable fashion. In short, Company G is a much-distorted outfit as the author shows it.

As for the officer characterizations, it

was probably to be expected that all officers would be shown, either as stinkers or incompetents, or both. I have heard a good deal about Schofield Barracks in the days just before World War II, from sensible officers who made good later on in combat, several of whom I've known for many years as human, fair and hard-working troop commanders. But you see none of these types in *From Here to Eternity*. Yet I confess that I have seen a few officers as bad as those shown in this book. They didn't last very many years, but a good many more than they should have.

As for the cruelty and torture that the author attributes to "the stockade," it is right out of a concentration camp, and conceivably that stockade may have seen at times much sadistic behavior by guards and others in charge. Here also, I think I have some background for comment because I was once the subject of an official investigation for cruel treatment of a prisoner. I will simply say this: In the course of experience with some ten guardhouses and stockades and one disciplinary barracks, during more than twenty-five years, I never ran into anything remotely resembling the cruelty and torture described by this author. Most post commanders I served under had a clear idea of prisoner treatment in their stockades. Even had they been inclined to overlook cruel treatment, colonels and generals alike would have known very well that they would be hearing from a Congressman and the War Department as soon as the man got out of the service, or even before. The Hawaiian stockade had several hundred men in it. Some of them—a good many of them—knew about writing to Congressmen. Some of them knew a Congressman.

Furthermore, for nearly two years I was defense counsel for general and special courts-martial at a post with reputedly the toughest guardhouse in the U. S. In that period I defended some hundred men, preparing their cases thoroughly. Many of those men told me inmost details of their lives. Not one complained about cruelty or showed any signs of mistreatment.

In the book, one soldier is savagely beaten to death, with the full knowledge of the major in charge of the stockade. And the medical officers who examine the body, accept the prison report that the man fell off a truck. It would be pretty hard to get both ears torn loose, your teeth knocked in and your jaw and nose broken, and a hundred other bruises besides—all by a fall from a truck. It is beyond belief that medical officers, not serving under a prison commander, would make any other official report than simply that "this man was beaten to death." And in my opinion, the stockade commander would have been up before a general court-martial for maltreatment of a prisoner, and the guard who did the

beating up before another for murder, as fast as I was jerked on the carpet for tying up and gagging a man because he was keeping 25 other prisoners awake by yelling and shrieking, all out of pure meanness. His fellow prisoners had already beaten him up once, and I very possibly saved him from serious injury by being "cruel" to him. The psychopathic personality, such as Prewitt and others pictured in the book, can give extreme difficulty to an outfit or prison commander. For many such cases there is no simple solution, and they are the ones who often bring out unwarranted cruelty. But that's another subject, which only expert penologists and psychologists should attempt to go into fully.

With all these distortions of background—and to me, such distortions are always a clear sign of lack of integrity in writing—*From Here to Eternity* is an extremely powerful and very well written novel. And as I said, you will hear a lot about it, and for a long time. And you can probably look for the author to produce still better works as he matures. I hope that part of his process of maturity will be a recognition of the fact that his first novel would have greatly gained in power and effect, if he had shown the whole truth of his infantry and island scene.—G. V.

Good Management Text

MILITARY MANAGEMENT FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE. By Col. John R. Beishline. Prentice-Hall, Inc. 289 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

In the foreword by General Joseph T. McNarney, one of our government's most intelligently hard-boiled administrators, we find the statement: "The effective and efficient utilization of man power, money and material by the armed forces is no longer only desirable; it has become an absolute necessity. The National interest demands an effective defense establishment that is capable of expeditious and decisive action. At the same time, the national economy requires that a balance be maintained between the military requirements, our overseas commitments, and the essential needs of our civilian population. The attainment of these objectives can be materially assisted through the proper appreciation and application of sound and proved principles of military management."

Colonel Beishline is a professional soldier; his side trip to a civilian university to acquire a Ph.D. in management was undertaken with military requirements in view. This book is Colonel Beishline's doctoral thesis, amended in form to improve its readability and general usefulness. It is an application of the author's years of military experience to the best civilian experience in management; the result is a theory of military management that is probably not the last word but at least the present word on a subject that

is becoming increasingly important to our national survival.

The book covers such subjects as basic management problems, military objectives, military policies, military planning, military organizing, military functions and functionalization, military command and leadership, military controlling, and many other current problems. It is written from the military, not the civilian viewpoint, and is, so far as this reviewer knows, the only book on management that places full emphasis on the military.—A.S.

Germans in American Uniforms

SKORZENY'S SECRET MISSIONS. By Otto Skorzeny. Translated from the French by Jacques Le Clercq. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 256 Pages; \$5.00.

Otto Skorzeny, billed by the publishers as "The Most Dangerous Man in Europe," was the chief of the German Friedenthal Special Unit which recaptured Mussolini for Hitler. He was head of the secret army which enforced Nazi demands on Petain; engineered the overthrow of the Horthy Government in Hungary in a desperate effort to bolster the Eastern front; commanded the special troops disguised as American soldiers who compounded the confusion during the Battle of the Bulge; and generally took on any desperate venture that needed a ruthless, crafty and highly intelligent leadership.

For these facts alone this book is important reading, and it gets high praise as a practical history of special operations. Some facts and speculations, however, should be pointed out. Most interesting of all is, "Where did the manuscript come from?" Skorzeny is still at large. How he could hide is difficult to understand. A strapping man, well over six feet, he bears a ferocious scar on his face. The manuscript has been translated from the French, not the German as one would expect.

Skorzeny claims that his English-speaking troops disguised as Americans during the Operation *Greif* phase of the Battle of the Bulge amounted to ten men who could speak English fluently; thirty to forty who could limp along; 150 who could make themselves understood; and about 200 who could say "OK." They had four American combat cars, thirty jeeps, fifteen trucks, and their uniforms were patched together from British uniforms. These figures do not jibe with the generally circulated American figures.

Statements like these turn up at every point in the manuscript. There is no doubt about the truth of the major episodes, but the supporting facts do not always ring true.

On one important point this book differs strongly from similar accounts by Americans and Britons, who took to special operations with a certain sense of fun and self-ridicule and usually with a fine disregard for military amenities. Skorzeny is deadly serious all the time, and

throughout the book is reflected his adulation for Hitler and totalitarian ideals.

Skorzeny is typical of the fascist and communist soldier: capable, ruthless, and blind in his devotion to his masters, and always deadly serious. The communists are even more menacing than the nazis, for few of them have known anything but communism.—R. G. McC.

"Jumbo" Wilson's Campaigns

EIGHT YEARS OVERSEAS 1939-1947. By Field Marshal Lord Wilson of Lybia. Hutchinson, 1950. 285 Pages; Illustrated, \$5.00.

A considerable number of Americans in the Middle East, in Italy and Washington during World War II came to know a splendid professional British soldier whose ample proportions and genial disposition won him the affectionate nickname "Jumbo" although he really wasn't that big. He was Henry Maitland Wilson who commanded the victorious British campaign against Graziani in 1940-41, led the ill-fated British campaign in Greece, put down the Iraq rebellion and conquered Syria in the summer of 1941, commanded the Mediterranean theater in 1944, and took over Field Marshal Dill's place on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington after Dill died.

Noting the current tendency to concentrate attention on the final victorious phases of the war against the Axis, Field Marshal Wilson decided to write his story of the grim days when Britain and her allies were fighting with extremely limited forces and suffering one reverse after another. He felt, quite correctly, that an account of the period when paucity of resources made improvisation necessary, when the switching of troops and equipment from one front to another gave the staffs concerned logistical tasks undreamed of in the staff colleges, might be of some value in the future. He now fears that the democracies will be compelled to wage similar defensive campaigns at the outset, if a new attempt is made to dominate Europe and the Middle East. His account also treats the problems facing a commander who had to deal with "non-belligerent" allies (Egypt), with neutral states within the area of operations (Iran), and finally with "co-belligerent ex-enemy states" (Italy).

These pages make a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the British campaign in Cyrenaica in 1940-41. To Wilson's disappointment Egypt did not declare war on Italy when she threw in her lot with the Axis. Therefore he had to conduct a defense of an Egypt that remained neutral! It was a great comfort to him to find that the Field Service Regulations of 1936, to which Wavell had contributed so much, could be adapted without essential change to the conditions of desert warfare. The successive defeats inflicted on the Italians in 1940-41 with limited British forces proved the



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JOHN DOS PASSOS: "Once I'd looked at it I couldn't help reading James Jones' **FROM HERE TO ETERNITY**. It is an impressive book... the only account of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor I've seen that doesn't have some damn self-serving axe to grind."

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OFF-DUTY READING

THE ETERNITY OF THIRTY-YEAR MEN

A MAN by the name of Jones, out of the Middle West by way of the United States Army, has just taken a long, long step toward becoming one of the major novelists on the American scene. His first novel, *From Here to Eternity* (Charles Scribner's Sons, \$4.00) is a brilliant, though sometimes inaccurately drawn picture of the last days of the "Old Army"—one company at Schofield Barracks in the mid-1940s, Pearl Harbor, like their officers are mostly thirty-year men, and they are alive. Any man who was in that army can find mistakes in the book, but Jones has not yet reached the magnificent craftsmanship of John Ford's *When the Boys Came Back*, whose wonderfully accurate *Guard of Honor* (Harcourt, Brace, \$3.95) has a Pullman Prize. But Jones has the fire, the urge to create, and the result is a novel of tough integrity and brutal force, a novel that will make the many mistakes because its author understands that in characterizing the people who read according to the laws that govern human nature, he is not writing what they never learn.

BY way of contrast, the book by the same publisher, Charles Scribner's Sons, \$3.00) by Jeremy Clark (the author of *Two Men*). This book, originally a novel, is a nice, amusing, average little specimen of the publication business wherein a bright young fellow named Clint Larkner gives the build-up to an advertising agency and then, after the two daughters of a huge dairy-product company, and his mother-in-law, then, suffering from an aggravated attack of constipation, is killed by a love interest, he tears the whole thing down. There is nothing literary, gentleman, the Army—almost any institution you can think of—more than 10 people of wisdom and integrity. By and large, the advertising process is justifying them. Which is why the fact that about an eighth of the build-up boys in the business to bring out a novel like this is a little frightening. The rest is being alive?

KENNETH ROBERTS has just written *Henry Gross and His Missing Rod* (Doubleday, \$3.00), an account of the extraordinary exploits of Henry Gross and a brief, entertaining study of drinking in general. A doctor, of course, is one who has the ability to know underground fresh-water resources with a forked stick. Some of Henry Gross's exploits are almost incredible, but—since it is impossible to suspect a witness of Mr. Robert's long and distinguished reputation for absolute accuracy—you will be impressed by what Henry Gross has accomplished and the possibilities his accomplishments unfold.

THE sub-title for *My Six Convicts* (Blanchard, \$3.50) is "A Psychologist's Three Years in Fort Leavenworth." That tells a good part of the story, but it should be noted that the psychologist, Dr. James Powell Wilson, was there doing research for a survey in drug addiction. This book is the story of his relations with his six convict subjects over the three years and his observations on prison life and penology generally.

WITH this issue, book advertising in these pages will no longer be prepared by the staff. In view of our planned advertising program, editorial space is beginning to get tighter and tighter. We are decided reluctantly that book ads would either have to be dropped or we would have to pay directly for our editorial space.

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soundness of pre-war doctrines. And the achievements of this campaign are often overlooked or minimized because they were won against an Italian army forced to advance by pressure from Mussolini. Yet the record is worth repeating. The British troops advanced 500 miles in two months, destroyed nine Italian divisions, captured 130,000 men, 1,200 guns, and 400 tanks. They never employed more than two divisions at any time, the 4th Indian rotating with the 6th Australian Division in support of the 7th Armored Division. A neat performance.

Marshal Wilson also throws new light on the Greek campaign. He shows that the Greeks were always more interested in Yugoslav support than they were in British aid. The strategy of the campaign reflected their concern for safeguarding communications with Yugoslavia. Here Wilson suffered the disadvantage of having his troops land in Greece under the watchful eyes of German consular officials. Thus by remaining on normal diplomatic terms with Greece until the moment of their invasion, the Germans had complete information about the size and composition of British forces. The only element of surprise must have been their astonishment that Britain sent any forces to Greece at all! He explains the tremendous battle the Greeks put up against the Italians by describing it as a "people's war" waged with religious fervor. When the Germans struck, the Greeks were not only overwhelmed by German materiel but they were no longer fighting a "people's war." The rapid breakthrough of the Germans in Yugoslavia undermined the whole strategy on which Wilson depended. It was fortunate that he took time out before the German attack to examine defense lines in the interior of Greece.

In retrospect Field Marshal Wilson believes that the British intervention in Greece had its greatest effect in causing Yugoslavia to break her treaty agreements with Germany. This caused Hitler to fly into a rage which provoked him to send more forces to the Balkans (twenty infantry and seven armored divisions) than was necessary. This had its effect in not only delaying the start of the Russian campaign but in cutting down the effectiveness of German armored divisions.


In 1943 Wilson was made British commander of the Middle East, an appointment which brought him into contact with many aspects of the war new to him. For one thing he had to deal with Greek and Yugoslav partisan forces operating against the Axis. For another he had to conduct negotiations over the rearmament of the Turkish army looking forward toward possible Turkish intervention in the war.

When Eisenhower left the Mediterranean area to become commander of SHAEF, Wilson succeeded him at Algiers. He inherited and carried out the Anzio

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operation, and got on so well with the Americans that he was indirectly accused of being anti-British. He was a firm supporter of the plan for invading southern France as a follow-up to Overlord. His account ends with a description of the months he spent in 1945 on the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. This book makes a valuable contribution to the history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East areas.—H. A. DEWEERD

Able Enemy Leader

ROMMEL: The Desert Fox. By Brigadier Desmond Young. Harper & Brothers, 1951. 264 Pages; Illustrated; Appendixes; Index; \$3.50.

During World War II, and after, speculation about German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel reached fantastic extremes. Rommel was the greatest general on either side. Rommel was a fake—a great military thinker. Rommel took dope. He was murdered. He committed suicide. Only one thing was certain—Rommel had captured the public fancy as few generals on either side succeeded in doing.

To come by the truth about him, and to analyze his career as a soldier dispassionately was another matter. It is apparent, however, that Brigadier Young has come as close on both counts as anyone is likely to for some time.

This book is not a full history of Rommel and his North African campaign. It is simply a military biography of Erwin Rommel, covering his distinguished career in World War I, his assignments between the World Wars, his part in the conquest of France, his operations in North Africa, his defense of Normandy, and the fantastic story of his death.

Rommel gained his greatest fame in the Western Desert, and about two-thirds of the book is devoted to this. Brigadier Young served in the Desert himself, and so has a solid basis for judging what the British and German commanders he was able to interview have told him, as well as the records of the operations. He has written a clear, integrated account of the Desert War, between Rommel with his Afrika Korps and the Italians, and the succession of British commanders, culminating in Rommel's long retreat from El Alamein. Even with the inadequate maps this is as clear a picture of the campaign—one of the most fluid of World War II—as you are likely to find short of the detailed official histories, both in print and in preparation.

His picture of Rommel as a personality and as a commander also comes up clear and sharp from the operational background. It is evident that Rommel was a first-rate tactician, although he, like other mortals, made his share of mistakes. He was also sound in the field of strategy. In light of what we know now, Rommel's plan—which would have required a minimum of two more divisions than the German High Command was willing to

give him (this in mid-1941)—to seize the Suez Canal and push on to Syria, Iraq, Iran, perhaps even the Caucasus, was far more practical than Hitler and the General Staff dreamed at the time.

Primarily, however, Rommel's place in history is secured by his performance as a field commander—as a man who could wring the last drop of energy, the ultimate in performance from his troops. A man of immense personal courage and iron will, Rommel also had that sixth sense that enabled him to pick out in all the swirling confusion of desert war, the decisive point in a given action and to be there on the spot. With the help of a good staff, he was almost alone among World War II commanders in being able to lead an army personally.

Brigadier Young has managed to cram much more—the high points of a full career—into his comparatively small book. Rommel's relations with Hitler, ending in Rommel's being offered the choice of taking poison or facing a "People's Court," were somewhat strange from the beginning and show Rommel to be a man of singularly little political acumen. The author has managed to untangle this tangled relationship extremely well.

The author evidently admires Marshal Rommel both as a soldier and as a man, and his admiration is at times expressed in terms that may irk many American readers, who were less inclined to applaud a good play by the enemy during World War II than were the British. As Young himself points out, there is much to be said for both views.

It is also true that the author's conclusions on strategy, on the relief of certain generals, both British and German, and on Hitler and the General Staff will be argued endlessly. (They are well on the way to that now, and one more book isn't going to make much difference.)

But the military reader will find here a splendid evaluation of one of the great troop leaders of our time. The general reader—though he may not know Marshal Rommel from Connie Mack—has an opportunity to be entertained while he is being instructed, for the author is that rare bird—a sound military writer whose prose is tight and clear and lightened with quiet humor.—O. C. S.

The Fatal Blunder

THE WAR WITHOUT GRANT. By Robert R. McCormick. The Bond Wheelwright Co. 245 Pages; Maps; Index. \$7.50.

The way things are going, library space devoted to books on the American Civil War must now equal or exceed the space devoted to books on Napoleon and his campaigns. It's a poor season that doesn't see a half dozen or so books on that period of American history. But have you noticed that few of them are the work of professional historians? The

amateurs have pre-empted the field and the result makes for much more liveliness and vigor. We are all for it. We hope more plumbers, mathematics teachers, radio announcers, diaper manufacturers, ministers, newspapermen and publishers get into it. We specifically mention publishers because the book we are concerned with here is by the publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*. That should occasion little surprise. Chicago is a hotbed of Civil War scholars and it would be more than surprising if the Colonel wasn't one of the stokers. And he's no Johnny-come-lately in the field, either. He published his story of Grant's generalship back in 1934.

In his introduction to *The War Without Grant*, Colonel McCormick writes that he has stumbled on the fatal blunder of the Civil War. It was, he says, the withdrawal of the Confederate garrison from Norfolk on May 9, 1862. Of that he writes: "If the garrison had been retained in Norfolk by Johnston, Lee would have captured McClellan's entire army. With that accomplished Lee could have taken Washington and won the war." That kind of a statement is what keeps interest in the Civil war at such a high state of excitement. This reviewer is not competent to pass on it but he is satisfied that right now somebody is dashing off reams of copy to prove otherwise. Hang on; the answer is coming.

The title of this book is slightly misleading. Colonel McCormick was unable to resist the temptation to include a chapter on Grant's Battle of the Wilderness to show the "difference between Grant's battle at the Rapidan and the battles of all his predecessors on this terrain." This chapter is twenty-two pages in length amounting to ten per cent of the whole volume and the longest chapter in the book.

The maps are superb and any close reader of Civil War histories may find them well worth referring to when he is reading other books on the subject.

—J. R. S.

"When in the Course . . ."

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY. By Edward Dumbauld. University of Oklahoma Press. 170 Pages; Bibliography; Index; \$3.00.

When the Continental Congress at Philadelphia on the 4th of July 1776 adopted the Declaration of Independence, it marked the end of British authority in what was to become the United States.

"We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness . . ."

So much of the Declaration most of us know, but few of us, to admit a disgrace—

ful fact, know more—or, apparently, care. Citizens of this country have been arrested for reading the Declaration at public meetings, and yet it expresses the basic tenets of our national philosophy—the philosophy that recognizes government as a man-made device for promoting human welfare, an instrumentality which the people may remodel or replace whenever it fails to give satisfactory service. It is not a mystical, glorified, metaphysical monstrosity as in nations where totalitarianism, collectivism and similar dogmas prevail.

This convenient and lucidly written book points out that it is necessary to do more than merely give lip service to the political philosophy which the Declaration propounds. One must be familiar with its historical background, with ideas and events which are now forgotten but were in the forefront of men's minds at the time it was written. One must know something of the political and Constitutional standards and customs of those days, and of the grievances that prompted its ratification.

Mr. Dumbauld discusses briefly the various tests and the adoption of the Declaration. Each passage is treated separately, the reasons for its original inclusion explained, and the various interpretations through the years—by the Supreme Court, by legislative bodies, by historians and others—are related. In connection with many passages Mr. Dumbauld has referred to related ideas appearing elsewhere in Jefferson's writings or in sources he might have used. He has supplied full documentation and frequent citations to other, detailed studies of specific subjects. He has, in short, produced a neat, convenient and accurate reference for historians, students, attorneys, judges—and patriots.—R. G. McC.

Army Camels

CAMELS TO CALIFORNIA. By Harlan D. Fowler. Stanford University Press, 93 Pages; Illustrated; Bibliography; \$3.00.

The so-called military mind came in for more than its share of condemnation a hundred years ago as today, and with no more reason. One of the many examples of forward military thinking was the importation of camels for use in the West, back in the 1850's. Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of War, and certain interested Army officers finally convinced Congress that the idea was worth a test. Through the efforts of Lieutenant David Dixon Porter of the Navy and Major Henry Constantine Wayne of the Army, the first shipment of camels was brought to this country in 1856.

Another shipment for the military arrived the next year; a civilian shipment arrived later.

Lieutenant Edward F. Beale tried the camels on a trip from Texas to California and return; he found that they were well

suited to certain desert conditions and far superior to horses and mules. The camels did not do too well on rock formations. Beale remained convinced that the camel had a place in transportation in the American Southwest, but the Civil War interfered with the proper evaluation and support of the experiment, and it finally died of inaction. One big strike against the innovation was the attitude of enlisted men and lower-ranking officers, who distrusted the unfamiliar brutes and neglected to give them the minimum of proper care.

As Mr. Fowler points out, the development of the West, particularly the construction of railroads, would have limited the term of the camel's usefulness in any event. But for the place and time the camel never had a fair test, either in the military service or in transportation. If the Civil War had not begun so soon after the importation of the first camels, it is quite possible that the camel-driver might have become as romantic a figure as the stage driver.

The book is entertaining reading, offering much of the flavor of the West and the hardy men who took part in the experiment. The last of the camels known to survive from the original experiments died in 1934—not very long ago. The legend of the animals still survives, and even now there are occasional rumors of somebody sighting a free-roving camel in the far reaches of the desert or up in the Rockies.—A. S.

Sheer Pleasure

ELEPHANT BILL. By Lt. Col. J. H. Williams. Doubleday & Company, 250 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.00.

I have never owned an elephant. I never expect to own one. But I had more sheer pleasure reading this book, devoted entirely to elephants, than I have had from any book in many a long month.

"It needs confidence," asserts the author, "to walk under an elephant's jaw and tusks armed with a belled knife with a ten-inch blade four inches across in one's left hand and a six-pound wooden club in the right hand, and then to tell him to hold up his head while you drive the knife up to the hilt into a huge abscess on his chest with one blow of the mallet."

It needs plenty of confidence, and Colonel Williams had it. When he arrived in Burma to handle elephants for a trading company he knew as much about them as a farm boy from Kansas. His instructor turned him loose with a herd, told him to learn about handling them the hard way, and finished up, "God help you if you can't look after them." He arrived at his station to find one elephant dead. Conducting a post mortem to find out what had happened, he literally climbed inside, and found everything except the kidneys and what had killed the beast.

Aided by his able Burmese assistants, Colonel Williams became an elephant expert without peer. This delightful, informal study of elephants who haul teak in Burma gives in fascinating detail some of the information Elephant Bill learned about his charges after working with them for twenty-two years. The heroic record of the elephants during the Burma campaign includes a vivid description of the harrowing trek forty-five of them made on a march over trackless 6,000-foot mountains into India—one of the best adventure stories you'll ever read.

Written with delightful humor, Elephant Bill's story is one you'll enjoy—even if you hate elephants. Highly recommended for a most entertaining evening.—R. G. McC.

Laboratory of Leadership

SIGNAL THIRTY-TWO. By MacKinlay Kantor. Random House, 370 Pages; \$3.00.

After almost 175 years of swelling for war and shrinking for peace, our Army is still groping for the formula for leadership and discipline. The New York Police Department, which musters about one infantry division in strength, doesn't have all the answers either, as we can learn by reading the newspapers. Some would-be Ph.D. could probably spend some time and effort profitably in comparing the two organizations, bearing down heavily on the subjects of stability under fire, graft, motivation and training.

MacKinlay Kantor, whose *Long Remember* is one of the fiction classics of the Civil War, and whose other books, including *The Voice of Bugle Ann*, have received wide public acclamation, spent more than a year in New York's Twenty-third Precinct, accompanying policemen on their assignments. The result of this year of on-the-spot research is a novel that offers good reading as a fiction story. It describes the workings of one segment of a metropolitan police department probably better than has been done in any other published work.


Not all of Kantor's characters are heroes. They have their weaknesses, their mental quirks and their personal troubles—just like soldiers. Although the book idealizes the New York City policeman, it does so convincingly. The Department should be a fine laboratory for a competent study of leadership and discipline because of its size, its organization, the fact that it is always in combat and the origins of its personnel. Kantor has made an unscientific start as a by-product of a very readable novel; someone should follow through.—A. S.

Sportsmen's Handful

SHOTGUNS. By Elmer Keith. Stackpole & Heck, 307 pages; illustrated; \$5.00.

THE ALL-SPORTS RECORD BOOK. By Frank G. Menke. A. S. Barnes & Company, 326 pages; \$5.00.

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EVERYDAY BALLISTICS. By Charles S. Cummings II. Stackpole & Heck. 138 pages; charts; \$2.85

HOW TO BE A CRACK SHOT. By Claude Parmelee. Greenberg, Publisher. 78 pages; illustrated; \$2.50.

MAUSER BOLT RIFLES, Vol. I. By Ludwig Olson. Published by the Author. 68 pages; illustrated; \$3.00.

Elmer Keith's quick once-over on shotguns is a chatty, personal account of guns he's owned and used. Of the 307 pages, only thirty-one are devoted to shooting—the rest cover guns and ammunition. Contains some highly informative dope, but lack of an index makes the book useless as a reference.

The All Sports Record Book will settle practically any argument on almost any sport record. Eighty-seven sports are covered extensively, plus the history-making events in more than a hundred others. A very useful book for the sports fan, and a grand addition to the company library.

Everyday Ballistics is a book about ballistic problems, not a book on ballistics. Twenty short chapters touch on such varied subjects as yaw, spin and spiral flight; recoil; velocity, time of flight and drop; measuring killing power; etc. A handy reference on specific questions, but not a thorough account of the subject.

Claude Parmelee's book on marksmanship is one of the best organized and illustrated I've seen yet. Short, sweet and snappy, his advice on rifle and shotgun marksmanship for field and range is excellent.

Sergeant Ludwig Olson has prepared a painstaking analysis of Mauser bolt-rifles. A highly useful reference for the serious collector and shooter. The photographs and identification tables are particularly valuable. An admirable work.—R. G. McC.

Books Received

GERMANY AND THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM. By General Lucius D. Clay. Harvard University Press. 83 Pages; \$2.00.

SHOOTING AN ELEPHANT AND OTHER ESSAYS. By George Orwell. Harcourt, Brace & Company. 200 Pages; \$2.75. Some random writings by the author of *Animal Farm* and *1984*.

THE AMERICAN IMPACT ON RUSSIA 1784-1917. By Max M. Laseyron. The Macmillan Company. 441 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

PAKISTAN: THE HEART OF ASIA. SPEECHES BY LIAQUAT ALI KAHN, PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN, DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. Harvard University Press. 151 Pages; \$3.00.

YEAR: MID-CENTURY EDITION: 1900-1950. Edited by Baldwin H. Ward. Year, Inc. 256 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.95.

THE WRATH OF ACHILLES: THE ILLIAD OF HOMER, SHORTENED AND IN A

NEW TRANSLATION. By I. A. Richards. W. W. Norton Company. \$2.50.

FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION. By Werner Levi. University of Minnesota Press. 233 Pages; Index; \$3.00. A plea and plan for world organization.

PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION. By the late William E. Mosher, J. Donald Kingsley and O. Glenn Stahl. Harper & Brothers. 652 Pages; Index; \$6.50. The third edition of a standard text first published in 1936.

POPSKI'S PRIVATE ARMY. By Lt. Col. Vladimir Peniakoff. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 369 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.75. The American edition of the book reviewed in the *Infantry Journal's* June 1950 issue.

WATER, LAND, AND PEOPLE. By Bernard Frank and Anthony Netboy. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 342 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$4.00. "The dramatic picture of our growing water famines and floods, the human consequences, and the possible remedies."

THE FRASER. By Bruce Hutchison; Illustrated by Richard Bennett. Rinehart & Company. 368 Pages; Index; \$4.00. The 42d volume in the *Rivers of America* series.

A CHRISTMAS STORY, VALLEY FORGE 24 DECEMBER 1777. By F. Van Wyck Mason. Doubleday & Company. 30 Pages; \$1.25.

THIS IS YOUR NAVY. By Theodore Roscoe. United States Naval Institute. 737 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.00.

AN AMERICAN HISTORY, VOLUME II. By Merle Curti, Richard H. Shryock, Thomas C. Cockran, Fred Harvey Harrington. Harper & Brothers. 697 Pages; Maps; Index; \$4.50. Volume II, dealing with the United States in the industrial age; the transition from a farming to a manufacturing economy.

MEMOIRS OF KING ABDULLAH OF TRANSJORDAN. Translated from the Arabic by G. Khuri; Edited, with notes and a foreword, by Philip Graves. Philosophical Library. 278 Pages; Index; \$3.75.

BIG PAN-OUT: THE STORY OF THE KLONDIKE GOLD RUSH. By Kathryn Winslow. W. W. Norton & Company. 247 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.75.

SKEET AND TRAPSHOOTING. By Dick Shaughnessy with Tap Goodenough. A. S. Barnes & Company. 180 Pages; Illustrated; Appendix; \$3.00.

ROBERT BURNS. By David Daiches. Rinehart & Company. 376 Pages; Index; \$3.50.

WASHINGTON FRICASSEE. Cooked up by M. B. Schnapper. Public Affairs Press. 78 Pages; \$1.00.

U. S. CAMERA ANNUAL 1951. Edited by Tom Maloney. Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 420 Pages; Illustrated; \$6.50.

THE SCHOLAR ADVENTURES. By Richard D. Altick. The Macmillan Company. 338 Pages; Index; \$5.00.

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
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
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